Plato -- Euthyphro & Apology
Contents:
(1) Philosophical Background
(2) Historical Background
(3) Euthyphro
(4) Apology
(1) Philosophical Background
(2) Historical Background
(3) Euthyphro
(4) Apology
(1) Philosophical Background:
Ancient Philosophy --in the Western canon-- is comprised by the collective 'Pre-Socratic' philosophers, those of whom we have record and/or writings surviving, and Socrates (mainly as recorded by Plato, for he did not himself write his works), Plato, and Aristotle.
Pre-Socratic Philosophers: Mainly Greek philosophers who lived before and during the time of Socrates (470-399 BCE); their surviving writings are predominately in fragments, with some known only through their re-telling by later thinkers. To broadly generalize, they explore topics broached by their re-asking of questions that their civilizations had answered prior primarily through myths. We can roughly divide the Pre-Socratics by those who sought to know and those who doubted that that was possible.
WHAT IS EVERYTHING MADE OUT OF?
DOUBTING: With Knowledge Comes Doubt
SOCRATES & PLATO:
Socrates influenced more of Western Civilization than it is easy to comprehend; each historical period we look at today, and the books we read this semester will reveal his influence. He was reputedly a wealthy, muscular but rather unattractive stonemason in the 5th c. BCE. He wrote nothing down, but we know of his exploits and thoughts mainly through Plato’s remarkable dialogues. In addition to their record of incredible irony, most memorable cuts and barbs (he relates various interlocutors calling Socrates all sorts of odd names, mostly playful putdowns, e.g. gadfly (Apology), torpedo fish (Meno), etc.), and the relation of or indirection to interesting myths and anecdotes (statues of Daedalus (Euthyphro and Meno), Proteus, Atlantis (Theatetus), three genders (Symposium), etc.), Socrates' amazing mind is demonstrated through his ability to ask questions, moreover, asking questions in a most impressive form of argumentation as elenctic dialogue. He engaged people in conversations and worked through philosophical questions by a dialectical method called Elenchos: a line of reasoning that counters or refutes a proposed claim by validating its conclusion’s opposites--i.e., the dialogues typically begin with someone proclaiming knowledge and another proclaiming ignorance, Socrates, typically as the humbly enquiring party, thus, e.g.: you have a topic; you propose a thesis about that topic; Socrates would ask a question clarifying your thesis; such would allow you to see a mistake in your thesis, thus you would refine it; and the questions would continue until you disprove that theory and move to an alternative to then deal with that new thesis in the same way, usually frustrating the interlocutor so much that they run off from the conversation with no definitive answer, which would, rather, prove Socrates' position that the matter thus demanded its careful study. The underlying argument is this: if you know what X is, then you ought to be able to give an account of it or say what it is. The knowing interlocutor proves they are not knowledgeable and cannot give a proper account of X. The ignorant one concludes that the interlocutor does not know X, thus justifying the investigation into its nature or existence, no mater how mundane it may seem to be. So, in general, we can say that Socrates used questions to get to the bottom line: this is a search for proper definitions; however, since the dialogues typically end in aporia, 'perplexity,' they reveal as much about the nature of seeking knowledge, the value of embodying wisdom, and the nature of thinking and constructing arguments, as much as they do ideas and insights into their topics. These insights help us to understand what the famous Greek Oracle at Delphi meant when it pronounced Socrates the wisest person, and his response was this must mean that he was wise to the extend that wisdom is the person who knew (admitted) his own ignorance--for why seek knowledge if you think that you already know it?!
Plato (ca. 428-348 B.C.E.), Socrates’ most famous student and a thinker easily named the greatest mind in Western history, is the reason why we know so much of Socrates today, for the master did not write his own works, but stars as the lead character in Plato's dialogues. Scholars consider many of his earlier dialogues (e.g., Euthyphro and Apology) to be fairly accurate expoundings of the beliefs of Socrates, while many of his later works to be more solely Plato’s own developed thoughts. (Nearly all are in dramatic dialogue form.) Plato has had an amazing impact on our entire human thought from formulating the basis of Christian theory to the bases of political and education organization. He started the first multi-subject school, called the Academy, in 387 B.C.E, which lasted nine centuries. He wrote on topics from art to law to sex to governing. He developed articulate and well argued theories about everything from existence to morality to the nature of thinking.
Perhaps Socrates/Plato’s most famous contribution is the Theory of Forms, underlying many and seen clearly in several dialogues, but is especially well formulated in his dialogue the Republic. According to this theory, what we encounter in the world through sensory experience is not the truly real, what is truly real is the eternal and unchanging Forms, also called Ideas, which can only be grasped intellectually. The best way to understand this is to think about circles. Imagine the perfect circle. This circle does not exist in the natural world; instead there are round things in the world, but no perfect circle. The perfect circle is the Form “Circle.” When we measure this or that round thing, we compare its roundness to the perfect one, the Form. Perfection, therefore, is what is ideal; all of the ideals are Forms. Beauty is also a Form; it is something that you cannot point to in the world, but it exists as some sort of ideal measure against which we compare things (as Plato puts it, things “participate” in the in the Forms, so a beautiful thing participates in the Idea of Beauty). The idea of an ideal and its re-presentations aid us in many areas of thought, much like a distinction between genus and species. Critiquing Euthyphro’s first definition of piety, Socrates complains, “… I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious …” (6d)--that is, to name the Form “circularity,” do not point to a full moon, an orange, a wheel, and a baseball, but name that which all of these things share in common: the nature of circularity itself.
According to Socrates/Plato, knowledge is true because it is knowledge of what is (falsity is what is not; it is mere lack of knowledge). But, it is not enough to know the truth; you must strive to become the truth. Here epistemology becomes ontology: to know is to be. Ignorance is almost universal, but what allows us to come out of the cave of ignorance and see the light of knowledge is the Forms. Everyone, in his/her soul has the Forms, which can be remembered: this is the theory of recollection, which can be thought of as akin to something like innate knowledge. Remembering these Forms is what constitutes true knowledge. To remember the Forms is to know the absolute truth, and to become just and wise. (This equation between the beautiful, the good, and the true is crucial to understanding Platonic ideas, and reverberates throughout Medieval philosophy, especially grounding Abrahamic theology.) The knowing-being link is well demonstrated in Apology, wherein Socrates models and articulates the keys to the well-lived life; further, in two of his most beautiful dialogues, the Phaedrus and the Symposium, Plato relates this coming out of ignorance and striving for wisdom to the pursuit of love (recall how 'philosophy,' as the conjunction of philos and sophia, is the love of wisdom), for love is that by which we know and realize the truth: it is a process of seeking higher stages of being.
ARISTOTLE:
Aristotle was undeniably Plato’s most distinguished pupil--even as many of his writings can be interpreted as rebellions against (or, more mildly, intelligent revisions to) his teacher's teachings. Christianity, first heavily influenced by Plato, became even more heavily dependent on Aristotle, who had been Alexander the Great’s tutor (Medieval philosophy shows trends of Platonic and others of Aristotelian direct influence, however even more of it show thinkers who have artfully synthesized their theories, for example, the masterful Saint Augustine, whose heavily-Platonic ethical writings are girded upon an mostly Aristotelian conception of soul). Aristotle wrote something about almost everything--on so many different things, from poetry to ethics, the soul to biology, logic to being, politics to the reproductive activities of animals to the characterization of plants to the movements of the heavens to probing topics of physics and structures of arguments, dramas versus comedies, and so on and so on.
Aristotle is probably most famous for his work the Metaphysics. He is, in fact, responsible for the name “metaphysics;” what we think of today as meaning the study of reality and being originally meant that it was his work that was shelved after the Physics, which examines nature, natural beings, as all that is in motion. Metaphysics, on the other hand, examines being; he opens this work with the famous line “all men by nature desire to know.” The goal of the Metaphysics is comprehensive (not certain) knowledge about what it is to be. For Aristotle, to be is to be something. And things are composed of form and matter (i.e. a statue is carved (form) marble (matter)). Both form and matter are crucial to a thing’s existence, but it is the form that is the essential nature of the thing because it is that which differentiates the thing from something else composed of the same matter. Existence (if it is), though, is only a first judgment to be made. After we have decided something exists, we must determine its essence (that it is, ousia) in two main steps: the first asks what is a thing in itself, what is it uniquely; and secondly, what is it that makes it like all these other things. After these two judgments, we then must determine “on account of what it is,” which means to find its cause--wherein everything that is, is due to four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final causes--and, at last, “what it is,” which means to determine its being. As you can tell from even this brief description, the Metaphysics is a very methodical work; it is extremely difficult, sometimes dry and repetitive, but also beautiful, and, it goes without saying, also a work of extreme importance and influence on later philosophy and knowledge itself.
Pre-Socratic Philosophers: Mainly Greek philosophers who lived before and during the time of Socrates (470-399 BCE); their surviving writings are predominately in fragments, with some known only through their re-telling by later thinkers. To broadly generalize, they explore topics broached by their re-asking of questions that their civilizations had answered prior primarily through myths. We can roughly divide the Pre-Socratics by those who sought to know and those who doubted that that was possible.
WHAT IS EVERYTHING MADE OUT OF?
- Thales (ca. 610-547 BCE) deduced this “basic stuff” that all nature is composed of to be water—i.e., a fluid, flexible substance that could take on many forms.
- Anaximander (611-547 BCE) primary matter must be more elemental, i.e. must be ageless, boundless, and indeterminate.
- Pythagoras (580-500 BCE) proposed that the basic nature of everything was numbers i.e. this is a point, two points makes a line, three points determine a surface, and surfaces make a solid, and solids make up bodies, everything physical in this world is a body, thus, all is numbers.
- Heraclitus (535-475 BCE) believed that the basic substance of the world was fire—i.e. that which can account for how everything changes. There is no reality except for the reality of change, i.e., permanence is an illusion (one cannot step into the same river twice). Change, however, is not random, but is fixed in order by logos (the word). Logos creates a system where everything is in harmony with its opposite.
- Anaxagoras (500-428 BCE): all changes in an object of experience are changes in the arrangements of underlying particles. These particles were infinitely divisible. Each substance had its own corresponding kind of particle and each substance has every other kind of particle in it as well (DNA): what distinguishes X from Y is the kind of particle unique to each. (Pre-cursor to the Atomists Leucippus and Democritus).
- Democritus (460-370 BCE): mathematician; theory of atomism: all things are composed of atoms. Atoms are tiny, imperceptible, indestructible, eternal, and uncreated particles composed of exactly the same matter but different in size, shape, and weight; they are numerous and constantly in motion; they combine and separate, which causes generation, decay, decomposition, erosion, and burning.
DOUBTING: With Knowledge Comes Doubt
- The Skeptics doubted the possibility of certain knowledge, or truth.
- The Sophists were rhetoricians, the earliest professors, who despised speculation for its uncertainty, yet used it for arguing, debating, and “proving” what was thought to be un-provable—often, these un-provable things were standards of behavior, and therefore, in a sense, they created moral philosophy.
- Xenophanes (560-478 BCE): even if truth was stated it could not be known.
- Gorgias (485-380 BCE): “There is no reality, and if there were, we could not know of it, and even if we could, we could not communicate our knowledge.”
- Protagoras (490-421 BCE): “man is the measure of all things:” there is no absolute knowledge. One’s person’s views about the world are just as valid and invalid as the next person’s views.
- Zeno of Elea (489-430 BCE): Motion is impossible.
- (1) An arrow traveling from the bow to the target can never get there because in order to get there it must travel half way, but to travel half way it must travel a quarter way, etc. You can never reach your destination because there are infinite steps there. A sliver of a step requires a sliver of time to transgress, which means each sliver of a step requires a sliver of time, which means that you need infinite time to cover an infinite distance, thus motion is impossible.
- (2) When a thing, let’s say a dog, moves from here to there, at every moment of her travel she occupies a space equal to her length. But, for a thing to occupy a space of its length means it is at rest. Thus at each moment the dog is at rest. If she is at rest at each moment, there is no movement.
- These paradoxes puzzle humans still. They are dangerous. What if there is no truth? Nothing essential?
SOCRATES & PLATO:
Socrates influenced more of Western Civilization than it is easy to comprehend; each historical period we look at today, and the books we read this semester will reveal his influence. He was reputedly a wealthy, muscular but rather unattractive stonemason in the 5th c. BCE. He wrote nothing down, but we know of his exploits and thoughts mainly through Plato’s remarkable dialogues. In addition to their record of incredible irony, most memorable cuts and barbs (he relates various interlocutors calling Socrates all sorts of odd names, mostly playful putdowns, e.g. gadfly (Apology), torpedo fish (Meno), etc.), and the relation of or indirection to interesting myths and anecdotes (statues of Daedalus (Euthyphro and Meno), Proteus, Atlantis (Theatetus), three genders (Symposium), etc.), Socrates' amazing mind is demonstrated through his ability to ask questions, moreover, asking questions in a most impressive form of argumentation as elenctic dialogue. He engaged people in conversations and worked through philosophical questions by a dialectical method called Elenchos: a line of reasoning that counters or refutes a proposed claim by validating its conclusion’s opposites--i.e., the dialogues typically begin with someone proclaiming knowledge and another proclaiming ignorance, Socrates, typically as the humbly enquiring party, thus, e.g.: you have a topic; you propose a thesis about that topic; Socrates would ask a question clarifying your thesis; such would allow you to see a mistake in your thesis, thus you would refine it; and the questions would continue until you disprove that theory and move to an alternative to then deal with that new thesis in the same way, usually frustrating the interlocutor so much that they run off from the conversation with no definitive answer, which would, rather, prove Socrates' position that the matter thus demanded its careful study. The underlying argument is this: if you know what X is, then you ought to be able to give an account of it or say what it is. The knowing interlocutor proves they are not knowledgeable and cannot give a proper account of X. The ignorant one concludes that the interlocutor does not know X, thus justifying the investigation into its nature or existence, no mater how mundane it may seem to be. So, in general, we can say that Socrates used questions to get to the bottom line: this is a search for proper definitions; however, since the dialogues typically end in aporia, 'perplexity,' they reveal as much about the nature of seeking knowledge, the value of embodying wisdom, and the nature of thinking and constructing arguments, as much as they do ideas and insights into their topics. These insights help us to understand what the famous Greek Oracle at Delphi meant when it pronounced Socrates the wisest person, and his response was this must mean that he was wise to the extend that wisdom is the person who knew (admitted) his own ignorance--for why seek knowledge if you think that you already know it?!
Plato (ca. 428-348 B.C.E.), Socrates’ most famous student and a thinker easily named the greatest mind in Western history, is the reason why we know so much of Socrates today, for the master did not write his own works, but stars as the lead character in Plato's dialogues. Scholars consider many of his earlier dialogues (e.g., Euthyphro and Apology) to be fairly accurate expoundings of the beliefs of Socrates, while many of his later works to be more solely Plato’s own developed thoughts. (Nearly all are in dramatic dialogue form.) Plato has had an amazing impact on our entire human thought from formulating the basis of Christian theory to the bases of political and education organization. He started the first multi-subject school, called the Academy, in 387 B.C.E, which lasted nine centuries. He wrote on topics from art to law to sex to governing. He developed articulate and well argued theories about everything from existence to morality to the nature of thinking.
Perhaps Socrates/Plato’s most famous contribution is the Theory of Forms, underlying many and seen clearly in several dialogues, but is especially well formulated in his dialogue the Republic. According to this theory, what we encounter in the world through sensory experience is not the truly real, what is truly real is the eternal and unchanging Forms, also called Ideas, which can only be grasped intellectually. The best way to understand this is to think about circles. Imagine the perfect circle. This circle does not exist in the natural world; instead there are round things in the world, but no perfect circle. The perfect circle is the Form “Circle.” When we measure this or that round thing, we compare its roundness to the perfect one, the Form. Perfection, therefore, is what is ideal; all of the ideals are Forms. Beauty is also a Form; it is something that you cannot point to in the world, but it exists as some sort of ideal measure against which we compare things (as Plato puts it, things “participate” in the in the Forms, so a beautiful thing participates in the Idea of Beauty). The idea of an ideal and its re-presentations aid us in many areas of thought, much like a distinction between genus and species. Critiquing Euthyphro’s first definition of piety, Socrates complains, “… I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious …” (6d)--that is, to name the Form “circularity,” do not point to a full moon, an orange, a wheel, and a baseball, but name that which all of these things share in common: the nature of circularity itself.
According to Socrates/Plato, knowledge is true because it is knowledge of what is (falsity is what is not; it is mere lack of knowledge). But, it is not enough to know the truth; you must strive to become the truth. Here epistemology becomes ontology: to know is to be. Ignorance is almost universal, but what allows us to come out of the cave of ignorance and see the light of knowledge is the Forms. Everyone, in his/her soul has the Forms, which can be remembered: this is the theory of recollection, which can be thought of as akin to something like innate knowledge. Remembering these Forms is what constitutes true knowledge. To remember the Forms is to know the absolute truth, and to become just and wise. (This equation between the beautiful, the good, and the true is crucial to understanding Platonic ideas, and reverberates throughout Medieval philosophy, especially grounding Abrahamic theology.) The knowing-being link is well demonstrated in Apology, wherein Socrates models and articulates the keys to the well-lived life; further, in two of his most beautiful dialogues, the Phaedrus and the Symposium, Plato relates this coming out of ignorance and striving for wisdom to the pursuit of love (recall how 'philosophy,' as the conjunction of philos and sophia, is the love of wisdom), for love is that by which we know and realize the truth: it is a process of seeking higher stages of being.
ARISTOTLE:
Aristotle was undeniably Plato’s most distinguished pupil--even as many of his writings can be interpreted as rebellions against (or, more mildly, intelligent revisions to) his teacher's teachings. Christianity, first heavily influenced by Plato, became even more heavily dependent on Aristotle, who had been Alexander the Great’s tutor (Medieval philosophy shows trends of Platonic and others of Aristotelian direct influence, however even more of it show thinkers who have artfully synthesized their theories, for example, the masterful Saint Augustine, whose heavily-Platonic ethical writings are girded upon an mostly Aristotelian conception of soul). Aristotle wrote something about almost everything--on so many different things, from poetry to ethics, the soul to biology, logic to being, politics to the reproductive activities of animals to the characterization of plants to the movements of the heavens to probing topics of physics and structures of arguments, dramas versus comedies, and so on and so on.
Aristotle is probably most famous for his work the Metaphysics. He is, in fact, responsible for the name “metaphysics;” what we think of today as meaning the study of reality and being originally meant that it was his work that was shelved after the Physics, which examines nature, natural beings, as all that is in motion. Metaphysics, on the other hand, examines being; he opens this work with the famous line “all men by nature desire to know.” The goal of the Metaphysics is comprehensive (not certain) knowledge about what it is to be. For Aristotle, to be is to be something. And things are composed of form and matter (i.e. a statue is carved (form) marble (matter)). Both form and matter are crucial to a thing’s existence, but it is the form that is the essential nature of the thing because it is that which differentiates the thing from something else composed of the same matter. Existence (if it is), though, is only a first judgment to be made. After we have decided something exists, we must determine its essence (that it is, ousia) in two main steps: the first asks what is a thing in itself, what is it uniquely; and secondly, what is it that makes it like all these other things. After these two judgments, we then must determine “on account of what it is,” which means to find its cause--wherein everything that is, is due to four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final causes--and, at last, “what it is,” which means to determine its being. As you can tell from even this brief description, the Metaphysics is a very methodical work; it is extremely difficult, sometimes dry and repetitive, but also beautiful, and, it goes without saying, also a work of extreme importance and influence on later philosophy and knowledge itself.
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"I have admired that noble, simple wise man [Socrates] of ancient times, my heart too has beat violently as that of the young man [Alcibiades] when he conversed with him, and the thought of him has been the enthusiasm of my youth and filled my soul to overflowing. I have longed for conversation with him as I never longed to talk with any man with whom I have talked; in the society of those who have comprehended everything and know how to talk about every possible subject I have many, many times longed for his ignorance and to hear him ..."
--Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 1849. |
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(2) Historical Background:
To give context specifically for reading Euthyphro & Apology
In the dialogues collected in The Trial and Death of Socrates (a later editing, not originally written together as a single volume), we learn about the before, during, and after of Socrates’ trial by Meletus (also Lycon and Anytus) for corrupting the youth by his impiety (in Apology, we learn the charges to be more complex, corrupting the youth and impiety, either as atheism or as invention of new gods, alongside implicit charges of making the weaker argument the stronger, studying things in the sky and beneath the ground, teaching these things to others, and accepting a fee for teaching). He is found guilty by the jury and sentenced to death.
But, why was Socrates on trial? On the one hand, from reading the dialogues we get a clear picture of how Socrates is truly the “gadfly,” a complete pest who cuts through egocentric hubris and intellectually puts people in their place; but, being a sometimes obnoxious old man is not really reason for a death sentence. So, on the other hand, another way to understand his trial is to understand the historical background of Socrates’ Athens. In brief:
Building the Empire: After 500 B.C.E., after Tyrant rule, various battles against the Persians led to the development of the Greek empire and Athens’ Golden Age. Greek colonies near Turkey came under threat from Persia, the Athenians offered support to the colonies, thus unleashing a Persian invasion of the Greek mainland. In 490 B.C.E., the Athenians won a great land battle at Marathon, 26 miles from Athens, rejecting the Persian assault. This battle initiated the Greek’s building of a navy, which was soon to become their central power, defeating the Persians for a second time in 479 B.C.E.. After the second Persian assault, Athens formed a defense league that eventually became its empire. Athens had popular government at home, but ruled over those overseas, thus, from this empire it became rich, instigating massive development, architectural wonders like the Acropolis, and began to attract many intellectuals.
Peloponnesian War: 431 B.C.E., between Sparta and Athens; the Spartans were powerful on land and the Athenians, with their large Navy, by sea, thus creating a long war where both sides were worn, but no major advances or victories happened by either side. After about ten years of fighting, a 50 year peace accord was signed, the Peace of Nicias (named after the Athenian general). Nicias, however, had fierce rivalry in the Assembly, notably by Socrates’ student, Alcibiades. Alcibiades, against Nicias, convinced the people to attack the island of Sicily in 415 B.C.E.. This attack was a disaster, leaving Athens weak, which was the opportunity that the Spartans had been waiting for; they attacked with the aid of the Persians (out of resentment for an attack by Athens in the early 5th c. B.C.E.). In 404 B.C.E., almost thirty years after the war began, Athens saw its defeat by Sparta.
Spartan Control: The Spartan’s now had unlimited yet indirect control over the Greek city-states; instead of ruling directly by implanting their own appointee, the Spartan’s pressured the Athenian Assembly to vote to choose thirty men as a Spartan-loyal oligarchic government, thus known as “the Thirty.” The Thirty effectively eliminated all political opposition with the support of the Spartan troops bringing on a fierce reign of terror. Their reign caused many Athenians to flee Athens as exiles, including the former generals of the prior democracy, notably including Anytus (one who indicted Socrates) and Thrasbulus.
In 403, the exiled democratic Athenians led an offensive on Athens, eventually defeating the Thirty. Democracy was restored and an amnesty was decreed asking for the exile of those friendly to the Thirty and disallowing any criminal cases concerning matters before the restoration of the democracy.
Socrates had remained in Athens during the Thirty’s rule, yet did not become involved with their crimes (although 5,000 Athenians had fled, and 1,500 of those who stayed were killed). In fact, he invited his own downfall by refusing to carry out a mission he had been given by the Thirty to arrest a man; had the Thirty not fallen soon after his refusal, he would likely have been killed. Nonetheless, there was a lot of hostility towards him; previously he had been seen as a bit of an eccentric, but not harmful nor dangerous. With the restoration of democracy, however, a great deal of blame, suspicion, and anger was directed at him; notably, he was seen as somehow responsible for his students’ (Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, etc.*) behavior in weakening Athens, supporting the Thirty, etc. Also, there were prolific writers (notably the politically conservative comedic writer Aristophanes*), who were writing hyperbolic or spoof accounts of the dangers of Socrates.
I wish this brief historical background to offer context that enriches your thinking through of these dialogues--and not to mislead you into thinking they present 'the' answer as to why Socrates was found guilty! To simply say that it was because of X--e.g., because he stayed in Athens, because of his associations with the men named above, because of Aristophanes' play, because he was a smart-ass to many powerful people, etc.--that he was sentenced to death is too hasty and more than likely over-generalized. Keep in mind elenchos and aporia ... engage yourself, no matter how uncomfortably it may become, in the long and careful process of thinking through, and do not fear perplexity, for to love wisdom and embrace wonder are the ingredients to the well-lived life.
In the dialogues collected in The Trial and Death of Socrates (a later editing, not originally written together as a single volume), we learn about the before, during, and after of Socrates’ trial by Meletus (also Lycon and Anytus) for corrupting the youth by his impiety (in Apology, we learn the charges to be more complex, corrupting the youth and impiety, either as atheism or as invention of new gods, alongside implicit charges of making the weaker argument the stronger, studying things in the sky and beneath the ground, teaching these things to others, and accepting a fee for teaching). He is found guilty by the jury and sentenced to death.
But, why was Socrates on trial? On the one hand, from reading the dialogues we get a clear picture of how Socrates is truly the “gadfly,” a complete pest who cuts through egocentric hubris and intellectually puts people in their place; but, being a sometimes obnoxious old man is not really reason for a death sentence. So, on the other hand, another way to understand his trial is to understand the historical background of Socrates’ Athens. In brief:
Building the Empire: After 500 B.C.E., after Tyrant rule, various battles against the Persians led to the development of the Greek empire and Athens’ Golden Age. Greek colonies near Turkey came under threat from Persia, the Athenians offered support to the colonies, thus unleashing a Persian invasion of the Greek mainland. In 490 B.C.E., the Athenians won a great land battle at Marathon, 26 miles from Athens, rejecting the Persian assault. This battle initiated the Greek’s building of a navy, which was soon to become their central power, defeating the Persians for a second time in 479 B.C.E.. After the second Persian assault, Athens formed a defense league that eventually became its empire. Athens had popular government at home, but ruled over those overseas, thus, from this empire it became rich, instigating massive development, architectural wonders like the Acropolis, and began to attract many intellectuals.
Peloponnesian War: 431 B.C.E., between Sparta and Athens; the Spartans were powerful on land and the Athenians, with their large Navy, by sea, thus creating a long war where both sides were worn, but no major advances or victories happened by either side. After about ten years of fighting, a 50 year peace accord was signed, the Peace of Nicias (named after the Athenian general). Nicias, however, had fierce rivalry in the Assembly, notably by Socrates’ student, Alcibiades. Alcibiades, against Nicias, convinced the people to attack the island of Sicily in 415 B.C.E.. This attack was a disaster, leaving Athens weak, which was the opportunity that the Spartans had been waiting for; they attacked with the aid of the Persians (out of resentment for an attack by Athens in the early 5th c. B.C.E.). In 404 B.C.E., almost thirty years after the war began, Athens saw its defeat by Sparta.
Spartan Control: The Spartan’s now had unlimited yet indirect control over the Greek city-states; instead of ruling directly by implanting their own appointee, the Spartan’s pressured the Athenian Assembly to vote to choose thirty men as a Spartan-loyal oligarchic government, thus known as “the Thirty.” The Thirty effectively eliminated all political opposition with the support of the Spartan troops bringing on a fierce reign of terror. Their reign caused many Athenians to flee Athens as exiles, including the former generals of the prior democracy, notably including Anytus (one who indicted Socrates) and Thrasbulus.
In 403, the exiled democratic Athenians led an offensive on Athens, eventually defeating the Thirty. Democracy was restored and an amnesty was decreed asking for the exile of those friendly to the Thirty and disallowing any criminal cases concerning matters before the restoration of the democracy.
Socrates had remained in Athens during the Thirty’s rule, yet did not become involved with their crimes (although 5,000 Athenians had fled, and 1,500 of those who stayed were killed). In fact, he invited his own downfall by refusing to carry out a mission he had been given by the Thirty to arrest a man; had the Thirty not fallen soon after his refusal, he would likely have been killed. Nonetheless, there was a lot of hostility towards him; previously he had been seen as a bit of an eccentric, but not harmful nor dangerous. With the restoration of democracy, however, a great deal of blame, suspicion, and anger was directed at him; notably, he was seen as somehow responsible for his students’ (Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, etc.*) behavior in weakening Athens, supporting the Thirty, etc. Also, there were prolific writers (notably the politically conservative comedic writer Aristophanes*), who were writing hyperbolic or spoof accounts of the dangers of Socrates.
- * Alcibiades, Socrates’ student; great military leader known for beauty, passion, ambition, desire for superiority—which may explain his tumultuous career in politics. Athenians variously loved and hated him; in love: he was powerful and fought strongly for Athens abroad; in hate: e.g., when accused (possibly framed) of defacing Hermes’ statues; fled country instead of answering charges. In anger for accusations, went to Sparta and helped them attack/defeat Athens; without his help, Sparta’s victory unlikely. Alcibiades (in Plato’s Symposium) is madly infatuated with Socrates, recounts boyhood attempts to seduce Socrates, exhibits reverence or admiration for Socrates’ bravery during war times.
- Critias, Socrates’ student; Plato’s second-cousin; prolific writer: plays, philosophical works, poetry; best known for leading role in the Thirty. Politically active with Alcibiades, likely sought exile with him in 406 b.c.e., although returned same year to join/lead oligarchic factions, notably their execution legions, during which he turned on old friend Alcibiades, issuing an assassination declaration in 403. Critias was killed in bloody fighting with the pro-democratic exiles who stormed Athens; with his death, the Thirty were leaderless and confused, and eventually toppled.
- Charmides, Socrates’ student; Plato’s cousin; leader of the ‘Ten’ who controled the Piraeus (near harbor, outside Athens) for the Spartans during the Thirty’s tyranny. In Platonic dialogue bearing his name, he surpasses all other boys in beauty and quite impressed Socrates with his physical, although not necessarily psychical, beauty.
- Despite his vicious portrayal of Socrates in the Clouds, Aristophanes figures as a main character in Plato’s Symposium, engaged in friendly, almost flirtatious, conversation with Socrates.
I wish this brief historical background to offer context that enriches your thinking through of these dialogues--and not to mislead you into thinking they present 'the' answer as to why Socrates was found guilty! To simply say that it was because of X--e.g., because he stayed in Athens, because of his associations with the men named above, because of Aristophanes' play, because he was a smart-ass to many powerful people, etc.--that he was sentenced to death is too hasty and more than likely over-generalized. Keep in mind elenchos and aporia ... engage yourself, no matter how uncomfortably it may become, in the long and careful process of thinking through, and do not fear perplexity, for to love wisdom and embrace wonder are the ingredients to the well-lived life.
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"The purpose of the dialogue [Euthyphro] is in part to inculcate correct methods of thinking, more especially the dialectic method. ... Instructions in methods of thinking may perhaps seem needless to modern readers; even they, however, may find it interesting, and in Plato's times it was undoubtedly necessary. Such instruction occupies an important place in most of the Platonic dialogues"
--W. R. M. Lamb, "Introduction to Euthyphro," in Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 3-4. |
Socrates discussing philosophy with disciples, painted in a 13th c. Turkish illuminated manuscript
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I wonder, though ... should we not be a bit more humble and honest ...? Do we not -- we 'modern readers' -- need this inculcation into the correct methods of thinking just as much, if not more, than even those in Plato's times ...???
(3) Euthyphro:
Socrates’ method, seeking the proper definition of X, is seeking the Form, the thing-in-itself. We see this excellently in the Euthyphro where the X or unknown is “piety.”
For the Greeks: PIETY tends to mean outward observances to gods, country, and parents. It means acting in expected ways and has little to do with beliefs.
The Characters:
Do you see any parallel between Euthyphro and Socrates?
Euthyphro seems to take himself to be like Socrates: they both delve into divine matters. Also, Socrates seems to compare Meletus’ case against him (trying him before his mother, the city) to Euthyphro’s against his father.
The Plot: Why piety?
Socrates is in the court to answer the indictment for corruption/ impiety by Meletus.
Euthyphro is there to prosecute his father for murder.
What do we learn about the charges against Socrates?
Corrupting the Youth. Impiety. Evaluate his tone about these charges (i.e. does he seem angered, scared, careless, make an argument for your guess as to WHY?).
What do we learn about the charges Euthyphro is leveling?
Vs. Father for murder (subject had killed another). Evaluate his tone about these charges (i.e., Euthyphro says he BELIEVES people will accuse him of impiety, but he says that he is NOT doing anything impious (4e)).
WHY is Euthyphro prosecuting his father for murder?
One of the father’s servants had gotten into a drunken rage and killed another. The father bound the killer and put him in a ditch and sent for religious advice from the priests or seers about what to do with the murderer. While the father waited, paying no attention to the bound man in the ditch, he died (from hunger and cold).
What do you think? Is Euthyphro being right, fair, just, pious?
What do you think of his personality, his attitude? Note the difference between the two, Euthyphro claims wisdom, Socrates claims ignorance (4e-5a).
For the Greeks: PIETY tends to mean outward observances to gods, country, and parents. It means acting in expected ways and has little to do with beliefs.
The Characters:
- Euthyphro: we know about Euthyphro only what we learn in this dialogue; he is an acquaintance of Socrates’; he is the accuser of his father; a classic seer, someone claiming to foretell the future but therefore always open to charge of charlatanism
- Socrates: he does not often go to the king-archon’s court (one of the nine Athenian magistrates who dealt with religious ritual and oversaw cases of alleged offenses to the gods); Euthyphro likens him to himself, a seer, but Socrates distances himself from ‘you prophets;’ he is the accused man by Meletus (“care”) for charges of corruption of the youth and impiety to Athenian gods (inventing new ones, not abiding the old ones); …
Do you see any parallel between Euthyphro and Socrates?
Euthyphro seems to take himself to be like Socrates: they both delve into divine matters. Also, Socrates seems to compare Meletus’ case against him (trying him before his mother, the city) to Euthyphro’s against his father.
The Plot: Why piety?
Socrates is in the court to answer the indictment for corruption/ impiety by Meletus.
Euthyphro is there to prosecute his father for murder.
- The legal difference in Athens between indictment and prosecution:
- Indictment is a public action to protect the state that can be brought by anyone.
- Prosecution is a private charge that has to be brought by one of the persons involved. Prosecution for murder needed to be brought by a family member, if possible, because murder was a private matter. In earlier days there were blood feuds, but now the law took over the matter but still the case had to be brought as a private action to free the family and city from blood-guilt.
What do we learn about the charges against Socrates?
Corrupting the Youth. Impiety. Evaluate his tone about these charges (i.e. does he seem angered, scared, careless, make an argument for your guess as to WHY?).
What do we learn about the charges Euthyphro is leveling?
Vs. Father for murder (subject had killed another). Evaluate his tone about these charges (i.e., Euthyphro says he BELIEVES people will accuse him of impiety, but he says that he is NOT doing anything impious (4e)).
WHY is Euthyphro prosecuting his father for murder?
One of the father’s servants had gotten into a drunken rage and killed another. The father bound the killer and put him in a ditch and sent for religious advice from the priests or seers about what to do with the murderer. While the father waited, paying no attention to the bound man in the ditch, he died (from hunger and cold).
What do you think? Is Euthyphro being right, fair, just, pious?
What do you think of his personality, his attitude? Note the difference between the two, Euthyphro claims wisdom, Socrates claims ignorance (4e-5a).
Let’s work through their arguments:
Do they come to a definition of piety? How many definitions?
in brief: The Pious:
Do they come to a definition of piety? How many definitions?
in brief: The Pious:
- 1. Prosecuting wrongdoers (5d-e)
- {Soc: but this is one of many pious actions…} {FORMS}
- 2. What the gods love [what is dear to the gods] (7a)
- {Soc: but they don’t agree w/ each other}
- 3. What all the gods love (8b)
- {Soc: defeat 10d: god-loved ≠ pious}
- 4. The part of justice that cares for the gods ((11d+) 12e)
- {Soc: so pious act improves a god? Service aims to achieve something, what do gods aim to achieve by our service?}
- 5. The knowledge of how to trade (give to / beg) with the gods through prayer and sacrifice (14(b)d-e)
- {Soc: but what benefit do the gods get from our gifts?}
- —return to pious is what is pleasing to the gods—15b.
Definition 1: Piety is Prosecuting Wrongdoers (5d-e):
5c-d: is piety one thing or is it different in each case?
Does he not begin the debate/conversation well? He offers an immediate definition backed up with arguments!
Socrates questions E’s argument … E insists on it … S questions other myths. Does this questioning of the myths make Socrates IMPIOUS? Or is it the literal nature he questions, does that save him from a charge of impiety against the gods?
What else is wrong with E’s argument?
Euthyphro is ignoring the FORMS? read 6 d-e
6d—S: What about other pious actions? So what makes X, Y, and Z all pious?
6d-e—What is Piety in itself? Its form?
Definition 2: Piety is What the Gods Love {what is dear to them} (7a)
Definition 3: Piety is What ALL the Gods Love (8b)
Do you think this is a better definition? What about the argument? Is it based upon tricks of language or is it really revealing something to us?
Interlude: Daedalus (11c)
Back to the Arguments… The 1st definition had to do with the prosecution of wrong doers—so, now our argument is going to move towards a definition that asks about justice and link up with the definition of the pious that asks what the gods love:
Definition 4: “…the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods…”
[Example of defining “the even” as “number divisible by two,” where “number” is the genus and “divisible by two” the difference.]
Does it make sense that piety is some part of justice?
Perhaps justice is obedience to law or lawfulness. Might piety be some part of lawfulness? Maybe there are laws about how we are to treat parents, country, and gods (perhaps these are “unwritten” laws).
But, let’s look backwards …
How do they get here specifically? Why talk about parts of justice?
Look at 11e: Socrates: “… see whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.” Euthyphro responds that he believes so. So, Socrates reverses the terms:
First, note that a just but not pious action may exactly be Euthyphro’s case … try his father:
So … which part of justice is it?
Soc: (13a) What is “care”?
SO—What happened to this definition?
Why did Euthyphro abandon it?
Why did he not answer the ‘service’s aim’ question?
THUS--the 4th Definition in short:
What answer was Socrates looking for?
Can we make others better?
Definition 5: The knowledge of how to trade (give to / beg from) with the gods through prayer and sacrifice (14(b)d-e)
Socrates reminds Euthyphro that that already proved this to be logically inconsistent, and before he can begin all over again, Euthyphro says he has to leave.
---THE END---
Does Euthyphro profit from this discussion? Do we see how hard it is when people’s interests conflict with their seeing the truth? But ... again ... what profit DOES come from this discussion? Are there truly good and helpful definitions herein? Are there directions given for better discussion and new definitions ...?
5c-d: is piety one thing or is it different in each case?
- Euthyphro: it is one thing.
- Socrates: what is it then?
- Euthyphro: what I am doing right now
Does he not begin the debate/conversation well? He offers an immediate definition backed up with arguments!
Socrates questions E’s argument … E insists on it … S questions other myths. Does this questioning of the myths make Socrates IMPIOUS? Or is it the literal nature he questions, does that save him from a charge of impiety against the gods?
What else is wrong with E’s argument?
Euthyphro is ignoring the FORMS? read 6 d-e
6d—S: What about other pious actions? So what makes X, Y, and Z all pious?
6d-e—What is Piety in itself? Its form?
Definition 2: Piety is What the Gods Love {what is dear to them} (7a)
- (1) The pious and impious are opposites (7a).
- (2) The gods are in conflict with each other (7b).
- (3) What the gods are in conflict about are such matters as just, unjust, beautiful, ugly, good, bad (7b-d).
- (a) humans disagree about such matters (rather than number, heavy / light, big / small where there is a clear measure) and so gods would too, if they disagree about things.
- --this offers us even a little insight into the “What is…” questions, those that we could ostensibly teach to a child may be easier for us to explicate than those things to which we cannot necessarily point…--
- (a) humans disagree about such matters (rather than number, heavy / light, big / small where there is a clear measure) and so gods would too, if they disagree about things.
- (4) They like what they consider beautiful, good, just and hate the opposites (7e). (This is the key in next refutation)
- (5) The same things are loved by some gods and hated by others (8a).
- Therefore, the same things are both pious and impious (definition is of no help).
Definition 3: Piety is What ALL the Gods Love (8b)
- (1) Where there is Xing and being Xed, something is Xed because of Xing
- (2) Because the gods love the pious it is being loved, they do not love it because it is
- being loved (the gods’ love makes the pious loved).
- (3) But they love it because it is pious.
Do you think this is a better definition? What about the argument? Is it based upon tricks of language or is it really revealing something to us?
Interlude: Daedalus (11c)
- Also referenced in Meno, 97D-E; legendary craftsman who made statues so real they were chained down.
- Pygmalion was the king of Cyprus and a sculptor who fell in love with one of his statues. He treated the ivory statue like a woman, spoke to it, named it lover, consort, etc. When the festival for Aphrodite came, he prayed to her to make his statue a real woman so he could marry it—she obliged. He returned from the festival to find his statue alive, they got married, had a child.
Back to the Arguments… The 1st definition had to do with the prosecution of wrong doers—so, now our argument is going to move towards a definition that asks about justice and link up with the definition of the pious that asks what the gods love:
Definition 4: “…the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods…”
- The pious is part of the just?
- Here we get the idea of the Genus and Species … this ought to be familiar from biology classes, where you learn that an oak is a species of the genus tree (Aristotle); Socrates is asking if the JUST is the GENUS of which the PIOUS is some SPECIES.
[Example of defining “the even” as “number divisible by two,” where “number” is the genus and “divisible by two” the difference.]
Does it make sense that piety is some part of justice?
Perhaps justice is obedience to law or lawfulness. Might piety be some part of lawfulness? Maybe there are laws about how we are to treat parents, country, and gods (perhaps these are “unwritten” laws).
But, let’s look backwards …
How do they get here specifically? Why talk about parts of justice?
Look at 11e: Socrates: “… see whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.” Euthyphro responds that he believes so. So, Socrates reverses the terms:
- If all that is pious is necessarily just
- Is all that is just necessarily pious?
First, note that a just but not pious action may exactly be Euthyphro’s case … try his father:
- People should prosecute the guilty
- Sons should not betray/accuse their fathers.
- But … this is not specifically addressed in the dialogue.
- But … is there support for it in the quote Socrates offers about shame? QUOTE (12b)
- OR … is the quote directed towards Euthyphro in a different aspect? Suggesting shame/fear as an explanation underlying Euthyphro’s egotistical claim to possess wisdom?
- OR … is the quote merely to illustrate how words can be reversed and lose their truth?
- There is no straight answer to this.
So … which part of justice is it?
- Socrates’ further explanation: What part of number is the even? The number that is divisible into two equal parts.
- Euthyphro: (12e) “… the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.”
Soc: (13a) What is “care”?
- Piety is care of the gods like horse breeding is the care of horses.
- This returns in Apology; not all benefit (care), but those with specialized knowledge, thus, those trained to benefit X)
- Thus: Care aims at the good and benefit of the object cared for.
- So, is piety aimed at bettering and benefiting the gods?
- E: NO.
- S: Okay, what is care then?
- E: Like slaves take care of their masters—service to the gods.
- S: To achieve what goal does this service aim?
- E: Many fine things. Note the tone
- S: How sum up “many fine things”?
- E: That which is pleasing to the gods is pious. {{ OFF TRACK }}
- So, is piety aimed at bettering and benefiting the gods?
SO—What happened to this definition?
Why did Euthyphro abandon it?
Why did he not answer the ‘service’s aim’ question?
THUS--the 4th Definition in short:
- Piety is a part of justice
- Which part?
- Care of gods
- What is care?
- -benefit
- -service
- (Euthyphro changes track and abandons this definition).
What answer was Socrates looking for?
- Either the pious is not merely a part of justice but the two are co-implicatory. Or, the pious is that part of justice that serves the gods through making ourselves and others more virtuous.
Can we make others better?
- We can try by cross-examining them as Socrates does and similarly we can try to make ourselves better by straightening out our opinions. Only knowledge really puts our souls in order. But we can serve the gods by really trying as Socrates is (Socrates’ divine mission). Maybe virtue is knowledge and piety is the pursuit of knowledge, i.e., philosophy.
Definition 5: The knowledge of how to trade (give to / beg from) with the gods through prayer and sacrifice (14(b)d-e)
- Socrates: {getting back ON TRACK} Is piety knowledge of Sacrifice and Prayer?
- E: Yes.
- S: So—piety is knowledge of giving to and begging from the gods?
- E: Yes.
- Notice how Socrates is working a new angle to get to the service/need question that Euthyphro refused in the last definition.
- E: Yes.
- (14d) To beg correctly is to ask for what we need. To give correctly is to give what they need.
- So … 14e: Piety would be a trading skill between gods and men?
- {{SKILL … ?}} what is a 'skill' ...? what is good and not so good about this definition?
- What is the benefit of gifts to the gods? (14e-15a) (Sure, we get all good from them, but what do they get from measly us?)
- E: Honor, Reverence, Gratitude (15a)
- S: So, pious pleases them, but neither beneficial nor dear?
- E: No, no, no… it is most dear to them.
- S: So, we are back to the definition of the pious being that which is most dear to the gods (15b).
Socrates reminds Euthyphro that that already proved this to be logically inconsistent, and before he can begin all over again, Euthyphro says he has to leave.
---THE END---
Does Euthyphro profit from this discussion? Do we see how hard it is when people’s interests conflict with their seeing the truth? But ... again ... what profit DOES come from this discussion? Are there truly good and helpful definitions herein? Are there directions given for better discussion and new definitions ...?
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“… for the unexamined life is not worth living …” --Socrates, in Plato's Apology, 38a. |
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(4) Apology
Introductory Comments on the Apology: Apology – Apologia: a defense given by oneself or in one’s name for answering formal charges. Thus, we do not have a dialogic demonstration of Socratic elenchos, as in the Euthyphro or his other works. During the address of the current charges, however, Socrates does engage Meletus in his characteristic ‘cross-examination.’
The work is divided into three parts:
The political organization of ancient Greece, as you have already learned, was a democracy at this time that was run by the:
Socratic Irony: The Apology, we are going to see is filled with irony. Irony means saying one thing and meaning another, typically the exact opposite of what was said, but not necessarily in a deceptive way. Typically, the irony can and should be detected and appreciated by those listening to Socrates’ and by us, reading the work; it should be interpreted as the revelations of the many levels of meaning, as opposed to any intentional deception, to illuminate ignorance.
Is there value in irony? If Socrates is going to refute people, is he ironic to soften the blow? Is their truth in Socrates’ profession of ignorance?
(17a): He says he is surprised the accusers called him a clever or accomplished speaker, one engaged in ‘persuasive speech’. Who would judge him as deceptively accomplished and clever? Likely, those “wise” men who were shown their own ignorance by Socrates’ questioning. Note how he begins his speech commenting how persuasive, yet entirely untrue, their speech had been—there is an implicit distinction between truth and persuasion by any means.
Yet, isn’t it a clever move to deny being a clever speaker? Is he here then ironic again? Is Socrates clever or not? If clever means getting off the charge then he is not.
Could Socrates have defended himself effectively? How? If he had come in crying and begging (perhaps dragging along weeping children and wives) he would have been acquitted, but he does not want it this way.
How does he want to speak? He says right below (17c) that he will speak in his usual fashion. He is now in court for the first time and will speak as he does outside the court. Thus he presents his speaking in court as an instance of how he normally speaks—precisely that that has gotten him into trouble! Thus, he confronts the court with himself. His conduct in court is his main exhibit of himself and it is his defense.
Notice also as we begin the work, that Socrates addresses the judges as “men of Athens” or “gentlemen”. This is not the correct form of address in the court. On the one hand, he is just asking the jury to judge on behalf of all the citizenry, but… Given all that I have indicated—that his is an unusual cleverness, that he does not try simply to get off, and that he speaks his usual way—might we not suggest that the whole dialogue is a dramatic reversal of roles:
for Socrates, it is not he who is on trial, but the city: is the city capable of handling/benefiting from his being in their midst, questioning them.
Look at the evidence:
The work is divided into three parts:
- 17a-35d: Socrates’ Main Speech, in which he addresses originary and current charges
- 35c-38b: Counter-Assessment by Socrates, which is Socrates’ counter-offer for the sentence
- 38c-42a: Socrates’ Last Words to the Jury
The political organization of ancient Greece, as you have already learned, was a democracy at this time that was run by the:
- Assembly: decision-making body of Athens’ politics, all males over 18 could attend and vote.
- Council: prepared the agenda for the Assembly, composed of 500 males over 30 years elected by lot for roughly one year term (11 months?).
- Jury: 501 jurors (drawn by lot out of a pool of all male citizens over 30 who volunteered for service—they acted as jury and judge, determining the guilt or innocence of the concerned party and chose one of the two sentences given by the accusors and accused. They were to judge on behalf of all the citizens of Athens, thus Socrates’ address to them as “men of Athens.”).
Socratic Irony: The Apology, we are going to see is filled with irony. Irony means saying one thing and meaning another, typically the exact opposite of what was said, but not necessarily in a deceptive way. Typically, the irony can and should be detected and appreciated by those listening to Socrates’ and by us, reading the work; it should be interpreted as the revelations of the many levels of meaning, as opposed to any intentional deception, to illuminate ignorance.
Is there value in irony? If Socrates is going to refute people, is he ironic to soften the blow? Is their truth in Socrates’ profession of ignorance?
(17a): He says he is surprised the accusers called him a clever or accomplished speaker, one engaged in ‘persuasive speech’. Who would judge him as deceptively accomplished and clever? Likely, those “wise” men who were shown their own ignorance by Socrates’ questioning. Note how he begins his speech commenting how persuasive, yet entirely untrue, their speech had been—there is an implicit distinction between truth and persuasion by any means.
Yet, isn’t it a clever move to deny being a clever speaker? Is he here then ironic again? Is Socrates clever or not? If clever means getting off the charge then he is not.
Could Socrates have defended himself effectively? How? If he had come in crying and begging (perhaps dragging along weeping children and wives) he would have been acquitted, but he does not want it this way.
How does he want to speak? He says right below (17c) that he will speak in his usual fashion. He is now in court for the first time and will speak as he does outside the court. Thus he presents his speaking in court as an instance of how he normally speaks—precisely that that has gotten him into trouble! Thus, he confronts the court with himself. His conduct in court is his main exhibit of himself and it is his defense.
- [Yet, remarkably, the speech has all the parts of a perfect rhetorical address: proem (prologue), narration, proof, and epilogue—or head, body, and tail as analogously explained as necessary for the art of rhetoric in the latter part of the Phaedrus.]
Notice also as we begin the work, that Socrates addresses the judges as “men of Athens” or “gentlemen”. This is not the correct form of address in the court. On the one hand, he is just asking the jury to judge on behalf of all the citizenry, but… Given all that I have indicated—that his is an unusual cleverness, that he does not try simply to get off, and that he speaks his usual way—might we not suggest that the whole dialogue is a dramatic reversal of roles:
for Socrates, it is not he who is on trial, but the city: is the city capable of handling/benefiting from his being in their midst, questioning them.
Look at the evidence:
- READ 30d Socrates pleads not for himself but for the city. And later he shows that he knows what to call the judges in the court: gentlemen of the jury.
- READ 39e-40a Socrates calls those who voted for his acquittal “judges,” the correct title, and thereby gives his judgment or verdict on the city.
Analysis of the Dialogue:
18a—I will defend myself against the first accusations/accusers, and then the later ones.
FIRST ACCUSATIONS (18a+):
THE IMPLICIT CHARGES:
Note that these early charges provoke Socrates to a defense of philosophy itself.
His defense (at least, what he literally offers as defense ...) : (19c-20c)
But, What, then, is his occupation? What has caused such dislike? Why is he on trial today???--
Oracle of Delphi (21a): (should be read as what actually constitutes his defense to the implicit charges!)
His reputation was gained because of a certain type of wisdom … human wisdom.
21a--the Oracle of Delphi—His friend, Chaerephon (one of the democrats who went into exile during the reign of the 30 tyrants, a childhood friend of Socrates), went to the Oracle of Delphi and asked if there was any man wiser than Socrates…the Oracle said no man is wiser.
What could lead Chaerephon to ask the question in the first place? Socrates must already be cross-examining people!
Socrates relates the story of the Oracle to explain his “divine mission,” the seeking out of anyone wiser in order to understand the Oracle’s message.
Everyone he spoke to and questioned was shown as thinking themselves wise, yet not possessing wisdom. He went to the politicians, the poets and tragedians, and finally the craftsmen.
Then Socrates understood the Oracle:
Wisdom is knowing that you do not know… and thus his “divine mission” was to show to others that their hubris keeps them from a truthful searching for wisdom (why search for what one thinks one already has?). Socrates is engaged in divine labors.
READ 23a-b —Relation of the Oracle’s pronouncement to all people--
Gods are wise and humans lack wisdom. Humans should imitate the gods so far as they are able, i.e., to become to be as wise as they can. He suggests that the oracle was using “Socrates” as an example to say that that human is wisest who recognizes his lack of wisdom--Thus, we all have this divine call--
Finally … Versus the corruption charge: The rich young men follow and copy his style of cross-examination (of their own free will), they get pleasure out of it, and hence the corruption charge (23c).
--now move to the Latter Accusations--
18a—I will defend myself against the first accusations/accusers, and then the later ones.
FIRST ACCUSATIONS (18a+):
- From the Many, notably Aristophanes (19c):
- Aristophanes’ Clouds is a comedic parody of Socrates, presenting him as believing in the divinity of the clouds, instead of the Greek gods, studying things such as how many times the flea’s leap is greater than the length of its feet, what to call a female pigeon, and through what part of the anatomy the buzz of a gnat comes.
- Aristophanes’ Clouds is a comedic parody of Socrates, presenting him as believing in the divinity of the clouds, instead of the Greek gods, studying things such as how many times the flea’s leap is greater than the length of its feet, what to call a female pigeon, and through what part of the anatomy the buzz of a gnat comes.
- Note: one the one hand, he is explaining where the charges come from, born from deep, longstanding bias, but, on the other hand, Socrates is effectively multiplying the charges against himself.
THE IMPLICIT CHARGES:
- (1) “… [Socrates] makes the worse argument the stronger” (18b-c), repeated shortly thereafter: “… he makes the worse into the stronger argument …” (19b-c).
- (2) “… Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the earth …” (19b-c)
- (3) “… and he teaches these same things to others” (19b-c), notably, also charging a fee (19d).
Note that these early charges provoke Socrates to a defense of philosophy itself.
His defense (at least, what he literally offers as defense ...) : (19c-20c)
- —All jury as witness, he does not discuss things of the sky and below the earth (religious matters)—although he holds nothing against those who do teach such.
- —He does not have the ‘wisdom’ of sophists, thus he charges no fee.
But, What, then, is his occupation? What has caused such dislike? Why is he on trial today???--
Oracle of Delphi (21a): (should be read as what actually constitutes his defense to the implicit charges!)
His reputation was gained because of a certain type of wisdom … human wisdom.
21a--the Oracle of Delphi—His friend, Chaerephon (one of the democrats who went into exile during the reign of the 30 tyrants, a childhood friend of Socrates), went to the Oracle of Delphi and asked if there was any man wiser than Socrates…the Oracle said no man is wiser.
- The Oracle of Delphi dates back to about 1400 b.c.e., and was a site where unusual vapors were released that could spark a frenzy in some and said to promote seeing into the future—after initial barricades for safety, a temple was built and a young virgin was placed therein to serve and embody the spirit of the goddess (granted, the virgin reputedly ran off with a handsome visitor, so all of the following oracles had to be a more reliable woman, preferably over fifty years old; but, the role was always held by women and afforded one of the few avenues for wealth, power, and high regard for women in Greece); the prophetizing continued until about the 4th c. and its suppression by Christianity.
What could lead Chaerephon to ask the question in the first place? Socrates must already be cross-examining people!
Socrates relates the story of the Oracle to explain his “divine mission,” the seeking out of anyone wiser in order to understand the Oracle’s message.
Everyone he spoke to and questioned was shown as thinking themselves wise, yet not possessing wisdom. He went to the politicians, the poets and tragedians, and finally the craftsmen.
- note: politicians represent the political power, the poets are much like the heart of communications, an early 'media', and the craftsmen were those who made all things needed, hence like our industry sector ... so, Socrates challenged all three categories of life ...
Then Socrates understood the Oracle:
- “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know” (20d).
Wisdom is knowing that you do not know… and thus his “divine mission” was to show to others that their hubris keeps them from a truthful searching for wisdom (why search for what one thinks one already has?). Socrates is engaged in divine labors.
READ 23a-b —Relation of the Oracle’s pronouncement to all people--
Gods are wise and humans lack wisdom. Humans should imitate the gods so far as they are able, i.e., to become to be as wise as they can. He suggests that the oracle was using “Socrates” as an example to say that that human is wisest who recognizes his lack of wisdom--Thus, we all have this divine call--
Finally … Versus the corruption charge: The rich young men follow and copy his style of cross-examination (of their own free will), they get pleasure out of it, and hence the corruption charge (23c).
--now move to the Latter Accusations--
LATTER (current) ACCUSATIONS (23d-24a+): From Meletus, Anytus, Lycon:
First, we must understand three main beliefs in most of Socrates’ works:
- Virtue is knowledge—explanation of this rather relies on the following two:
- No one desires evil * —what we want is the good, if we do desire evil, it is b/c we think it is good.
- No one deliberately does evil—they are just ignorant of what the good really is.
- * Re: 2nd point: Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not hold the idea that we can never knowingly desire evil; he permits us 'incontinence' or Akrasia (Nicomachian Ethics). Akrasia is not a character virtue/vice, it is rather conflict from desire for pleasure seeming to have the power to overcome our reasoning about the right choice—we indulge evil even when we know it is not good. Incontinence is weakness of will: I may know X is better than Y, yet I choose Y anyway. Aristotle claims that Plato denies the possibility of incontinence, blaming this sort of behavior only on ignorance of the good—Aristotle accepts there is a form of ignorance at play which is caused by disordered nonrational desires, but rejects there being an ignorance of general principles (e.g., we know we should not steal, but we do not know how to apply this principle to some particular cases, like money found on the street)--BUT…, then: one ought not overindulge one’s appetites; to eat fifteen cupcakes is overindulgence; one makes the correct decision not to eat them; then, after eating them anyway, one fails to recognize it as having been overindulgence.
- * Re: 2nd point: Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not hold the idea that we can never knowingly desire evil; he permits us 'incontinence' or Akrasia (Nicomachian Ethics). Akrasia is not a character virtue/vice, it is rather conflict from desire for pleasure seeming to have the power to overcome our reasoning about the right choice—we indulge evil even when we know it is not good. Incontinence is weakness of will: I may know X is better than Y, yet I choose Y anyway. Aristotle claims that Plato denies the possibility of incontinence, blaming this sort of behavior only on ignorance of the good—Aristotle accepts there is a form of ignorance at play which is caused by disordered nonrational desires, but rejects there being an ignorance of general principles (e.g., we know we should not steal, but we do not know how to apply this principle to some particular cases, like money found on the street)--BUT…, then: one ought not overindulge one’s appetites; to eat fifteen cupcakes is overindulgence; one makes the correct decision not to eat them; then, after eating them anyway, one fails to recognize it as having been overindulgence.
First Argument (24c-25c)
- (1) Soc: If Meletus really cares about the youth of Athens, he can say who makes them better.
- (2) Mel: The laws
- (3) Mel: All Athenians are teachers of virtue except Socrates
- (4) Soc: Do all persons improve horses or other animals, and only one corrupts them? Is it not the case that only the expert improves them and most corrupt them? (Virtue is knowledge.)
- (5) Therefore, by analogy, all persons cannot improve human youth.
- (6) Meletus cannot say who makes the youth better.
- CONCLUSION: Meletus has not cared about the youth.
Meletus first answers that the LAWS improve the youth—Socrates quickly chides him for he had asked for WHO not WHAT, but what do we find in Meletus’ answer?
- It is the answer of a democrat: everyone has something to contribute to virtue; everyone but Socrates teaches virtue; teaching virtue is like teaching speech, and so everyone teaches it.
Now … If virtue is knowledge, then what sort of knowledge is it?
- Is it like speaking a language or a more specialized craft? Even if none of us is wise with the knowledge of virtue, still it seems that teaching it might be quite difficult and not for just anyone.
So Socrates makes the analogy of caring for horses and other animals where there is one expert and other people corrupt them. He seems to have an aristocratic view of virtue and teaching. So, Socrates seems to refute Meletus, but not necessarily increasing his popularity in Athens.
The underlying premise, the conclusion, is: if Meletus cares about serious matters and the charges, then he can say who makes the youth better, but he can’t, so he doesn’t.
Although Socrates has already shown Meletus’ ignorance of the charge, he offers a second argument to entirely defeat the corruption of youth accusation by furthering the idea that Meletus really has NO care for the youth:
Second argument (25c-26a) (First, two charges leveled vs. Meletus, then the argument against this charge proper):
- (A) Does Meletus really care about youth? If so, he would deal with Socrates appropriately.
- (B) If Socrates corrupts the youth, does he do so deliberately?
- (1) It is better to live among good than wicked citizens
- (2) Wicked always do harm to those who are (always) closest to them and good benefit (but “always”?—what do you think ... do wicked always harm those around them? What sort of 'harm' might this be?)
- (3) Does anyone want to be harmed rather than benefited?
- (4) Does Socrates corrupt deliberately or unwillingly?
- (5) If he corrupts, it must be unwillingly.
- (6) Meletus never sought to correct Socrates privately as would be appropriate.
- Conclusion: Again Meletus does not seem to care about youth or he would have spoken to Socrates privately before bringing him to court.
Notice the use of the idea that no one knowingly chooses evil; the evil would be having evil people around you who will inevitably bring harm upon you.
The deliberate versus unwillingly argument is that because of no one wishing evil done to oneself eliminates the possibility of Socrates deliberately corrupting anyone; but if he had unwilling corrupted someone the legal and proper course of action would be for s/he who realized this to talk to Socrates privately about the matter and teach him not to corrupt anyone. Since none of the accusers spoke to him about this, then they must not believe that his actions were unwilling.
Next Charge IMPIETY:
“… [Socrates does] not believe in the gods in whom the city believes but in other new spiritual things …” (26b).
Third Argument: IMPIETY (26b-28a) (two initial points, then argument proper)
Note: Additional evidence for Socrates’ belief in the gods is from his address of the first accusations, his discussion of his faith in the Oracle of Delphi and his divine mission.
But… let’s think about two issues here:
“… [Socrates does] not believe in the gods in whom the city believes but in other new spiritual things …” (26b).
Third Argument: IMPIETY (26b-28a) (two initial points, then argument proper)
- (A) Teaching impiety, Socrates would corrupt youth, but does he really?
- (B) Has Meletus made coherent charges against him?
- (1) Is Socrates an Atheist or does he believe in different gods than Athens?
- Meletus settles on the charge: Socrates does not believe in gods at all and is an atheist
- Response: Socrates: Are you charging Anaxagoras? Meletus: —no, no, you do not believe in any gods.
- (2) Does anyone believe in human things but not in humans?
- Spiritual things, but not spirits?
- (3) So no one believes in divine things but not in gods
- (4) The accusation says Socrates believes in divine beings
- (5) These are either gods or children of gods
- (6) For there to be children of gods there must be gods
- So, Socrates must believe in gods;
- And, Meletus’ charge is incoherent; he hasn’t really cared about the charges brought.
Note: Additional evidence for Socrates’ belief in the gods is from his address of the first accusations, his discussion of his faith in the Oracle of Delphi and his divine mission.
But… let’s think about two issues here:
- (one) (27a): But, is there a trickery in Socrates’ logic? He moves from not believing in ATHENS’ gods but in new gods to NOT believing in ANY gods but believing in new gods? The latter formula obviously contradicts itself, but does the former? Not to say he is guilty of such, but why the evasion? Is it merely the fault of the respondent Meletus? (ignoring the difference between atheism and believing in different gods)?
- (two), remember very early in the Euthyphro (6a), Socrates expresses his doubt and asks if Euthyphro really believes in the tales about the gods, especially Zeus castrating his father. Does this show a skeptical Socrates? Is it ironic? Or is it merely an honest question to see if Euthyphro believes in these things.
After the Refutation of Meletus, Socrates addresses a few additional issues: Pride; Politics; Teaching:
PROUD OF HIS LIFE:
The first, concerns the rhetorical question: Are you ashamed of the life you have led and the actions that have brought you to this trial and the risk of death? (28b).
He responds: the good should do what they must do regardless of risk (28b+):
Like the heroes (28c+),
Like in war (28e+).
He will not quit philosophy, even if acquittal depended upon it (29c-30a).
Understand me, regardless if you vote to acquit or convict (30b).
If you do, even if you kill me, you will not harm me.
Do not mistreat the gods by condemning me.
POLITICS:
Socrates says that he is the same man in private as he is in public (33a), yet, he refuses to get involved in political life or public affairs. Why does Socrates go around and deal so much with people in private rather than getting into politics so that he might seem to serve the many? He avoids politics because his divine sign tells him not to get involved. The divine sign only tells Socrates what not to do (31d). He would have been killed years ago and not benefited anyone (31a).
The fight for justice requires a private life (32a), yet, his private life was not a quiet one: “I have deliberately not led a quiet life …” (36b). This has been demonstrated by his deeds: namely, in the trial of the ten generals and then the incident with Leon of Salamis. He resists both the democracy and the tyranny; the first louder than the second, in which his rebellion is quietly going home.
Is political life directed by wisdom? (The city runs on opinion, philosophy seeks knowledge). What is the responsibility of wise parties to helping the masses, to participating in governing?
TEACHING:
Does Socrates suppose himself a teacher?
What is his explanation of his lack of success?
He tells the jury that he will not beg; they should forbid anyone to as they cast a bad impression of Athens and violate the principles of justice and fair trials. Instead, Socrates has intended to teach and to persuade the jury (35c).
PROUD OF HIS LIFE:
The first, concerns the rhetorical question: Are you ashamed of the life you have led and the actions that have brought you to this trial and the risk of death? (28b).
He responds: the good should do what they must do regardless of risk (28b+):
Like the heroes (28c+),
Like in war (28e+).
He will not quit philosophy, even if acquittal depended upon it (29c-30a).
Understand me, regardless if you vote to acquit or convict (30b).
If you do, even if you kill me, you will not harm me.
Do not mistreat the gods by condemning me.
POLITICS:
Socrates says that he is the same man in private as he is in public (33a), yet, he refuses to get involved in political life or public affairs. Why does Socrates go around and deal so much with people in private rather than getting into politics so that he might seem to serve the many? He avoids politics because his divine sign tells him not to get involved. The divine sign only tells Socrates what not to do (31d). He would have been killed years ago and not benefited anyone (31a).
The fight for justice requires a private life (32a), yet, his private life was not a quiet one: “I have deliberately not led a quiet life …” (36b). This has been demonstrated by his deeds: namely, in the trial of the ten generals and then the incident with Leon of Salamis. He resists both the democracy and the tyranny; the first louder than the second, in which his rebellion is quietly going home.
Is political life directed by wisdom? (The city runs on opinion, philosophy seeks knowledge). What is the responsibility of wise parties to helping the masses, to participating in governing?
TEACHING:
Does Socrates suppose himself a teacher?
- He says that he has never been anyone’s teacher (33a), and that he will talk with anyone. (Doesn’t he really concentrate on the gifted rich young men? see 37d) Is he responsible for the actions of his friends/students? Might yanking the rug out from under people have some danger? Presumably he yanks the rug out gently where necessary. This is part of the purpose of irony, to have multiple levels of meaning.
What is his explanation of his lack of success?
- We cannot really make others virtuous in any case, they must try themselves. We have seen Socrates fail, both in this dialogue and elsewhere. Why he fails is that the interlocutor does not cooperate, does not try hard enough. (Some people enjoy spending time with him because it is not unpleasant to have people shown they are ridiculous: this is the heart of comedy.) Socrates is making worthy friends. None of the relatives of those he has associated with are accusing him.
He tells the jury that he will not beg; they should forbid anyone to as they cast a bad impression of Athens and violate the principles of justice and fair trials. Instead, Socrates has intended to teach and to persuade the jury (35c).
36a-38b: Counter-Assessment by Socrates (Penalty Speech):
Socrates is convicted by a vote of 280 to 221, so a change of 30 votes and he would have been acquitted. Also, by dividing the votes by the three accusers it appears that each got only 93 votes and so fell short of a fifth (i.e., 100 votes), and so would have had to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas (along the lines of a discouragement against frivolous lawsuits).
Socrates declares that a man such as himself, who neglects wealth and political position and who seeks honest truth and cares most of all for his city and its citizens, deserves free meals in the Prytaneum (town hall): “The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy” (36e).
Happy? Whom does he make happy? Were the politicians, poets, and craftsmen happy? Was Euthyphro happy? Doesn’t the dialectic end in aporia, perplexity? But … the goal, if we are patience enough, is happiness—it is THE GOOD LIFE.
This relates intimately to his explanation of why exile or stopping philosophy is impossible:
38 a : “… for the unexamined life is not worth living …”
So, requesting free meals is not said in arrogance; rather, it says that he has done nothing wrong, and to offer a penalty is to acknowledge guilt. Also, there is no other option: he does not know if death is good or bad, so how is he to say if it is any better than imprisonment (divorced from his city and her people), a fine he could not pay b/c he is poor, or exile (why any different elsewhere? And cannot give up philosophy b/c it is the god’s command).
Finally offers one mina of silver as his counter assessment (about $25). Then, says his friends are making him say 30 minae (about $750).
Socrates is convicted by a vote of 280 to 221, so a change of 30 votes and he would have been acquitted. Also, by dividing the votes by the three accusers it appears that each got only 93 votes and so fell short of a fifth (i.e., 100 votes), and so would have had to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas (along the lines of a discouragement against frivolous lawsuits).
- For Athens we think a talent of silver was about 60 lbs. A mina is a sixtieth of a talent. A mina is 100 drachmas, and a drachma is 6 obols. If the rate of gold to silver was about 1:10, then a mina, being approx. 2 oz. of gold is worth about $1000. But a drachma was a laborer’s day’s pay. We are told that one mina was about one-fifth of all Socrates’ wealth.
Socrates declares that a man such as himself, who neglects wealth and political position and who seeks honest truth and cares most of all for his city and its citizens, deserves free meals in the Prytaneum (town hall): “The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy” (36e).
Happy? Whom does he make happy? Were the politicians, poets, and craftsmen happy? Was Euthyphro happy? Doesn’t the dialectic end in aporia, perplexity? But … the goal, if we are patience enough, is happiness—it is THE GOOD LIFE.
This relates intimately to his explanation of why exile or stopping philosophy is impossible:
38 a : “… for the unexamined life is not worth living …”
So, requesting free meals is not said in arrogance; rather, it says that he has done nothing wrong, and to offer a penalty is to acknowledge guilt. Also, there is no other option: he does not know if death is good or bad, so how is he to say if it is any better than imprisonment (divorced from his city and her people), a fine he could not pay b/c he is poor, or exile (why any different elsewhere? And cannot give up philosophy b/c it is the god’s command).
Finally offers one mina of silver as his counter assessment (about $25). Then, says his friends are making him say 30 minae (about $750).
38c-42a: Socrates’ Last Words to the Jury
(A) His last words start with force: VENGEANCE.
Not only have you killed Socrates, but Worse will come …
“It is for the sake of a short time, men of Athens, that you will acquire the reputation and the guilt, in the eyes of those who want to denigrate the city, of having killed Socrates, a wise man, for they who want to revile you will say that I am wise even if I am not. If you had waited a little while, this would have happened of its own accord. You see my age, that I am already advanced in years and close to death” (38c-d).
… I would much rather die after this kind of defense [rational]
than live after making the other kind [tears and fake lamentations] … (38e).
(B) Then, SOFTENS.
(C) And, a REFLECTION ON DEATH.
(A) His last words start with force: VENGEANCE.
Not only have you killed Socrates, but Worse will come …
“It is for the sake of a short time, men of Athens, that you will acquire the reputation and the guilt, in the eyes of those who want to denigrate the city, of having killed Socrates, a wise man, for they who want to revile you will say that I am wise even if I am not. If you had waited a little while, this would have happened of its own accord. You see my age, that I am already advanced in years and close to death” (38c-d).
… I would much rather die after this kind of defense [rational]
than live after making the other kind [tears and fake lamentations] … (38e).
(B) Then, SOFTENS.
- But, to those of you who voted to acquit, stay and talk: Come and let us discuss the meaning of what has happened at this trial until the time I must die (39e-42).
- The divine sign never stopped me in my speech, so I am sure that I have done the right thing and what the gods wished.
(C) And, a REFLECTION ON DEATH.
- Do not fear death. There are two viable options for what happens after death, and neither is cause to fear.
"The Death of Socrates," Jacques-Louis David, ca. 1782, held by The Met, NYC.
Apology Study / Reflection Questions:
1) Find several examples of Socratic Irony in the Apology; is his irony malicious/deceptive in these cases and/or does it serve another purpose, and what would that be?
2) If Socrates is not a clever speaker (17a-c), why does he multiply the charges and accusers against him (18a-b)?
3) If Socrates is really concerned about the well-being of the Athenians, as he contends against the charge of corrupting the youth, should he not do all that he can to stay alive and continue to help them? Why doesn’t he do all that he can to stay alive? (See variously 29c+, 40c-41b).
4) Socrates suggests to the Athenian jurors that they ought to convict s/he who acts pitifully in court (wailing, crying, parading one’s family there, etc., see 35b-d), which has been suggested to fulfill the function of appeasing the injured party and freeing the one on trial from charges, and instead to acquit those who teach and persuade the jurors. Since he is on trial for precisely that, teaching and persuading people, why would he say such a thing to the jurors? Will he not just anger all of them and assure himself of a conviction?
5) Socrates suggests that politics is dangerous to philosophy (31c-33b); in light of his trial coinciding with the restoration of democracy, evaluate his suggestion. Is this the case today as well (any examples?), or only historically, or not even then?
6) Socrates claims that Meletus and Anytus have attempted to unjustly execute him (30d), but says that he is not angry (35e-36a). Shouldn’t injustice anger anyone, especially Socrates, who has spent his life on a godly mission for wisdom, and necessarily, justice? Why or why not?
7) Why is Socrates not surprised that he was convicted (35e-36b)? Does he think that he did not argue well, as he says in the beginning he is not an accomplished speaker? If this is not the case, then why is he not surprised and what does that say about his claim about his speaking skills?
8) Two famous quotes or ideas come from the Apology: (a) wisdom is knowing what you do not know (21d), and (b) “… the unexamined life is not worth living …” (38a). After briefly explaining the context for these ideas, speculate on these in relation to Socrates himself, namely: if Socrates is said to be wise in the sense of (a), yet he does not fight all out for an acquittal in court, should we assume that he has already examined all of life, and can thus die wise, or, otherwise, why would his life no longer be worth living?
9) After sentencing, Socrates sets up a parallel between: avoiding death is easier than avoiding wickedness and convicting him is easier than giving an account of one’s own life. How do you understand this passage and these parallels, especially in light of Socrates’ two most famous ideas born from the Apology: wisdom is knowing what you do not know (21d), and “… the unexamined life is not worth living …” (38a)?
10) How are Socrates’ last words to the jury his guilty verdict against Athens? What textual support can we use for this claim and why would Socrates judge Athens?
11) Why would Socrates ask those who voted him guilty to watch over his sons after he is executed (41e)?
12) If you were a lawyer for Socrates, how would you advise his speech to the jury? If you would change his speech, what would you have him add or not say and why, if you would not change his speech, why not?
13) After Socrates was found guilty, he refused to propose exile as his counter-assessment (his option for a penalty for the verdict). In detail, explain why he refused this option, and if you had to convince him to go into exile, what would you argue against his refusal?
14) Do the definitions and discussions on piety in the Euthyphro aid Socrates in addressing the charge of impiety from Meletus (26b+)? If so, how and why, if not, how not and why not?
15) Is Socrates impious? Give at least three pieces of evidence for impiety and three against impiety.
16) If Socrates’ divine mission is to teach what the oracle taught him, why does he not get into politics or public affairs and be able to reach many more people than talking one on one with the Athenians (31c-33c)?
17) Elaborate and either support or critique Socrates’ views on death (29a, 30c-d, 39a-b, 40c+).
18) Socrates’ argument against the charge of impiety moves from not believing in Athens’ gods to not believing in any gods. Is there trickery here? Is he evading the argument? Why does he make this clarification?
19) Will Socrates give up philosophy? Explain and evaluate why or why not, in detail (29e-30b, 37e-38a).
20) Will Socrates accept exile? Explain and evaluate why or why not, in detail (37c-38a, 39a-40c).
21) Socrates says, “…a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and…his affairs are not neglected by the gods” (41c-d). Evaluate this claim in light of the Apology’s historical background and its verdict and sentence.
22) Chaerephon, Socrates’ friend and one of the exiled democrats during the reign of “The Thirty,” asked the oracle of Delphi about Socrates’ wisdom. Why would he ask if Socrates was not already engaging people in dialogue? If this is so, does this and how would this have any affect on Socrates’ testimony about his divine mission?
23) Does Socrates defend himself against Meletus’ charges or does he indict Meletus? Argue both positions (24c-28b).
1) Find several examples of Socratic Irony in the Apology; is his irony malicious/deceptive in these cases and/or does it serve another purpose, and what would that be?
2) If Socrates is not a clever speaker (17a-c), why does he multiply the charges and accusers against him (18a-b)?
3) If Socrates is really concerned about the well-being of the Athenians, as he contends against the charge of corrupting the youth, should he not do all that he can to stay alive and continue to help them? Why doesn’t he do all that he can to stay alive? (See variously 29c+, 40c-41b).
4) Socrates suggests to the Athenian jurors that they ought to convict s/he who acts pitifully in court (wailing, crying, parading one’s family there, etc., see 35b-d), which has been suggested to fulfill the function of appeasing the injured party and freeing the one on trial from charges, and instead to acquit those who teach and persuade the jurors. Since he is on trial for precisely that, teaching and persuading people, why would he say such a thing to the jurors? Will he not just anger all of them and assure himself of a conviction?
5) Socrates suggests that politics is dangerous to philosophy (31c-33b); in light of his trial coinciding with the restoration of democracy, evaluate his suggestion. Is this the case today as well (any examples?), or only historically, or not even then?
6) Socrates claims that Meletus and Anytus have attempted to unjustly execute him (30d), but says that he is not angry (35e-36a). Shouldn’t injustice anger anyone, especially Socrates, who has spent his life on a godly mission for wisdom, and necessarily, justice? Why or why not?
7) Why is Socrates not surprised that he was convicted (35e-36b)? Does he think that he did not argue well, as he says in the beginning he is not an accomplished speaker? If this is not the case, then why is he not surprised and what does that say about his claim about his speaking skills?
8) Two famous quotes or ideas come from the Apology: (a) wisdom is knowing what you do not know (21d), and (b) “… the unexamined life is not worth living …” (38a). After briefly explaining the context for these ideas, speculate on these in relation to Socrates himself, namely: if Socrates is said to be wise in the sense of (a), yet he does not fight all out for an acquittal in court, should we assume that he has already examined all of life, and can thus die wise, or, otherwise, why would his life no longer be worth living?
9) After sentencing, Socrates sets up a parallel between: avoiding death is easier than avoiding wickedness and convicting him is easier than giving an account of one’s own life. How do you understand this passage and these parallels, especially in light of Socrates’ two most famous ideas born from the Apology: wisdom is knowing what you do not know (21d), and “… the unexamined life is not worth living …” (38a)?
10) How are Socrates’ last words to the jury his guilty verdict against Athens? What textual support can we use for this claim and why would Socrates judge Athens?
11) Why would Socrates ask those who voted him guilty to watch over his sons after he is executed (41e)?
12) If you were a lawyer for Socrates, how would you advise his speech to the jury? If you would change his speech, what would you have him add or not say and why, if you would not change his speech, why not?
13) After Socrates was found guilty, he refused to propose exile as his counter-assessment (his option for a penalty for the verdict). In detail, explain why he refused this option, and if you had to convince him to go into exile, what would you argue against his refusal?
14) Do the definitions and discussions on piety in the Euthyphro aid Socrates in addressing the charge of impiety from Meletus (26b+)? If so, how and why, if not, how not and why not?
15) Is Socrates impious? Give at least three pieces of evidence for impiety and three against impiety.
16) If Socrates’ divine mission is to teach what the oracle taught him, why does he not get into politics or public affairs and be able to reach many more people than talking one on one with the Athenians (31c-33c)?
17) Elaborate and either support or critique Socrates’ views on death (29a, 30c-d, 39a-b, 40c+).
18) Socrates’ argument against the charge of impiety moves from not believing in Athens’ gods to not believing in any gods. Is there trickery here? Is he evading the argument? Why does he make this clarification?
19) Will Socrates give up philosophy? Explain and evaluate why or why not, in detail (29e-30b, 37e-38a).
20) Will Socrates accept exile? Explain and evaluate why or why not, in detail (37c-38a, 39a-40c).
21) Socrates says, “…a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and…his affairs are not neglected by the gods” (41c-d). Evaluate this claim in light of the Apology’s historical background and its verdict and sentence.
22) Chaerephon, Socrates’ friend and one of the exiled democrats during the reign of “The Thirty,” asked the oracle of Delphi about Socrates’ wisdom. Why would he ask if Socrates was not already engaging people in dialogue? If this is so, does this and how would this have any affect on Socrates’ testimony about his divine mission?
23) Does Socrates defend himself against Meletus’ charges or does he indict Meletus? Argue both positions (24c-28b).