Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
(ca. 475-524/5)
~ ~ ~ Contents:
~~~~~~~ (I) Introduction to Boethius
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (A) Biographical Sketch
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (B) Philosophical Sketch
~~~~~~~ (II) The Consolations of Philosophy
(I) Introduction to Boethius
Boethius (ca. 475-524/5) is thought to have been born in Rome about 45 years after the death of Saint Augustine (354-430 c.e.) in Hippo (now, Algeria) and is thought to be a contemporary of Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 471-512/518), who is thought to have lived in Syria. While their homelands differ, Boethius’ life and philosophy bear interesting similarities to the other two thinkers.
(A) Biographical Sketch of Boethius
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 475-524/5):
Born Roman, at the same time as the deposition of the last Roman emperor, into an important family that had included emperors and consuls. His family was thought to be Christian by faith and he completed five important theological treatises; after his death, he was regarded as a Christian martyr (in 1883, the cult of Boethius at Pavia was sanctioned by the Second Congregation of Rites, and the Feast of St. Severinus Boethius was assigned October 23rd), although there is some scholarly debate as to his own religiosity and whether he abandoned it for paganism, due to his lack of explicit Christian reference in The Consolations at his tragic end. One explanation for this is that his form of The Consolations was styled after the Greek dialogues, thus making direct references to the Christian faith inappropriate. This explanation is perhaps weak, as Neoplatonism and Christianity merged frequently in numerous philosophical forms of writing. A better explanation may be that the religious spirit in The Consolations is universal and his aim was not to write a strictly theological work. For our purposes, be the object cloaked as Roman or Christian, or even if it was Greek or Chinese, the intense interplay between the mortal and immortal and between reason and faith illuminate the unique Medieval contribution to the history of philosophy.
Boethius was orphaned young and raised by Symmachus, whose daughter, Rusticana, he married. He was sent to Athens for study; he was well educated, exposed to the many active Athenian philosophic schools of thought, and became fluent in Greek. His superior education, namely in languages, led to his hire by King Theodoric the Great upon his return to Italy. He became a senator by 25 and counsel to the kingdom of the Ostrogoths, then, in 522, he was appointed “magister officiorum,” the head of government and court services (the same year, his sons were named consuls).
During his early service, he wrote commentaries on Porphyry and Cicero and completed translations of Plato and Aristotle. His later philosophical work included five theological Tractates, a translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge, the continuation of his translation project of Plato and Aristotle, which now included two commentaries on each, as well as another that was to reconcile the two Greek masters, a commentary on Cicero’s Topica, and a music textbook.
Politically, one of his notable works was towards trying to reestablish relations between the Churches in Rome and Constantinople--this may have led to his disfavor (although his general critique of governmental corruption may have had a more substantial role). In 524 or 525, Boethius was imprisoned in Pavia, in Northern Italy, and later executed by Theodoric for suspicion of conspiring with the Eastern Empire for his defense of another ex-counsel (the charges being treason, allegedly plotting to “restore Roman liberty,” but also some act of “sacrilege,” likely the engagement in practices of magic or just astrology). His rise and fall were dramatic. As H.R. James’ 1897 translation’s proem characterizes it:
Noble, wealthy, accomplished, universally esteemed for his virtues, high in the favour of the Gothic King, he appeared to all men a signal example of the union of merit and good fortune. His felicity seemed to culminate in the year 522 A.D., when, by special and extraordinary favour, his two sons, young as they were for so exalted an honour, were created joint Consuls and rode to the senate-house attended by a throng of senators, and the acclamations of the multitude. Boethius himself, amid the general applause, delivered the public speech in the King’s honour usual on such occasions. Within a year he was a solitary prisoner at Pavia, stripped of honours, wealth, and friends, with death hanging over him, and a terror worse than death, in the fear lest those dearest to him should be involved in the worst results of his downfall.
--The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius, trans. H. R. James (London: Elliot Stock, 1897), Proem.
This is the context and the atmosphere that birthed, while imprisoned, his famous work Consolation of Philosophy. Written as a prosimetrum, prose interspersed with verse, and a dialogue between Boethius and Lady Philosophy, this text was resoundingly popular throughout the Middle Ages, as evidenced by the existence today of over 400 translations from those following years. In 1883, the Church honored him officially as a martyr and his following was confirmed as a Beatus.
(B) Philosophical Sketch of Boethius’ Work
Boethius’ intellectual work centered upon the concern with the preservation of ancient wisdom, especially philosophy. He had intended to translate all of Aristotle and Plato into Latin, but completed only some (but his translation of Aristotle’s works on logic were the only significant pieces of Aristotle available in Europe until the 12th c.; his commentary thereupon served as a logical textbook for later generations). His commentaries on Aristotle included one on Categories and two on On Interpretation; another commentary is on Porphyry’s Isagoge: all of these formed a standard inclusion in later study of logic, beyond his logical textbook itself. His Theological Tractates predominately tackled theological problems through logical analysis. Then, in addition to his famous Consolation (De consolation Philosophiae), his works on Music (De institutione musica), the Trinity (Opuscula Sacra), and arithmetic (De arithmetica) survive.
Boethius served as a superlative conduit between Greek Neoplatonists (Porphyry, Iamblichus, etc.) and later Latin Medievalists; he had a profound impact on philosophic thought throughout the Middle Ages. While this early period of Medieval philosophy was dominated by Neoplatonism, and Boethius’ style is comparable to Platonic dialogues, we can also see the strong Aristotelian influence in his content. For instance, Book Three is greatly akin to the first book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics on the ultimate good of happiness and the many mistaken goods that are thought to satisfy it.
An interesting debate about his work is its relation between the prose and poetry, and why Lady Philosophy so sharply dismisses the muses. Another interesting question about his philosophy is his relation to stoicism. While Book One offers a critique of stoicism (at the same time that he critiques Epicureanism), much of his work, especially the poems, seems firmly stoic, if not more dramatically and outrightly ascetic.
Stoicism’s goal is ataraxia, mental tranquility or a state free from worry, as an apatheia, an apathy that is the absence of passion, a state free from emotional disturbance; peace of mind.
(II) The Consolations of Philosophy:
While his most famous work, The Consolation of Philosophy is often cited as distinct from and actually in contrast to most of Boethius’ writing.
Title: De Consolatione Philosophiae, The Consolation of Philosophy.
“Consolation” is a translation of the Latin consolatio, which is the conjunction of con-, with, and -solari, to soothe. A consolation is, thus, the comfort received from another during a trying time or after a deep disappointment (although it can also identify the person or thing comforting one), although also specifically designated a ceremonial oratory meant to provide rhetorical comfort at events like funerals; their standard form was to begin with the statement “all must die.” Note the interesting contrast that this was typically a Stoic practice (tell audience that all must die as a way to work into a cessation of personal anxiety over tragedy), but based on the powers of persuasion in rhetoric, that is, an appeal to and work on passions by a philosophy eschewing the passions.
Style:
Formally known as “Prosimetrum,” the alteration of prose and verse, or verse interspersed through prose, Boethius’ work also includes dialogue. Note, the Richard H. Green translation ordered for class translates very literally to preserve the philosophical import more clearly; Boethius’ original used approximate rhymes throughout—approximate, because it was more the rhythm of the lines than perfect work rhymes—the rhythm is manipulated through diverse meters and styles, all heavily reliant on repetition of prose lines in the meter/poems and redirection of the prose by the meter/poems. Very shortly after the appearance of the work around 525, the copying and translation began; today, from its appearance to now, there are over 400 translations of the work.
It is typical to cite the work as, e.g.: (I.3) for Book One, Prose Three, or: (II.m.5) for Book Two, Meter/Poem Five.
Text (overview):
Philosophy, then, is consoling Boethius herein; however, this consolation is not through simple sympathy, but through reason, by showing him that true happiness is not damaged by the tremendous unhappiness that he currently feels, finding himself in jail, facing death, and fearful for the fate of his family. In fact, Lady Philosophy is a harsh “physician” or “nurse;” her message is that he has no real reason to complain. True happiness cannot be destroyed, no matter the precipitous degree of damage done to him by his capture, false accusations, slander, imprisonment, and impending torture and death.
The Consolation of Philosophy, then, is about human happiness and how to achieve it, despite and amidst suffering.
Boethius’ real circumstances set the scene for the imagined dialogue between him and Lady Philosophy. He eventually recognizes her, and she proceeds to “cure” him of his sorrow and anxiety. He is not able to take her strong medicine at first, so she begins gently, before leading him into the true cure, the bitter medicine that be found sweet, upon its digestion. Book I has her ask him recount his troubles. Book II is her “gentle” discussion of fortune, and how we esteem it as fickle, and she schools us that bad fortune is actually even better than only knowing good fortune, for only if we know the bad, can we fully understand and appreciate the good. Book III begins the bitter medicine. The end is happiness; but those goods we presume to bring us happiness are not the true causes.
Following III.m.9’s invocation to God, in terminology reminiscent of Plato’s Timaeus, III.10 introduces us to how the perfect good and perfect happiness are not in God, but are God. But, of course, this raises the philosophical problem as to whether happiness comes from merely knowing God, or, as III.11 suggests, by acting well? III.11-12: God rules the universe by being its final cause: the good that all things desire. This picture makes God wholly non-interventionalist; he presides over the well-ordered world that is well-ordered because He exists. But, what about Boethius’ earlier complaint that the powerful trample over the good, and only humans lack the order the rest of the world has? The book ends on the raising of the question of evil, which is then addressed more in the remaining two books. Book IV.1-4 argues, reminiscent of Plato’s Gorgias, that evil does not prosper, it is, instead, powerless; the good is what all desire, it is happiness; only the good are happy; the wicked are powerless because their wickedness prevents their being happy, thus makes them powerless to bring about that which they desire. Further, the good receive their reward immediately as happiness; the wicked bring about their own punishment, since want is a lack, evil is a privation of existence, thus, they lower themselves below human existence. Book IV ends with discussions of providence and fate—providence is the divine reason itself that orders all things, whereas fate is the order of things seen in the unfolding events through time; fate belongs to the mutable things and accounts for difference, whereas providence belongs to the divine mind; everything changeable is subject to fate, and fate itself is subject to providence, hence, everything is ultimately ordered and governed by providence. This leads us to Boethius’ concern in Book V: Chance … is there such a thing as chance? While Lady Philosophy has already told us no, this prompts a radical problem: if there is no chance, and Providence rules all, how can there be free will?
While his most famous work, The Consolation of Philosophy is often cited as distinct from and actually in contrast to most of Boethius’ writing.
Title: De Consolatione Philosophiae, The Consolation of Philosophy.
“Consolation” is a translation of the Latin consolatio, which is the conjunction of con-, with, and -solari, to soothe. A consolation is, thus, the comfort received from another during a trying time or after a deep disappointment (although it can also identify the person or thing comforting one), although also specifically designated a ceremonial oratory meant to provide rhetorical comfort at events like funerals; their standard form was to begin with the statement “all must die.” Note the interesting contrast that this was typically a Stoic practice (tell audience that all must die as a way to work into a cessation of personal anxiety over tragedy), but based on the powers of persuasion in rhetoric, that is, an appeal to and work on passions by a philosophy eschewing the passions.
Style:
Formally known as “Prosimetrum,” the alteration of prose and verse, or verse interspersed through prose, Boethius’ work also includes dialogue. Note, the Richard H. Green translation ordered for class translates very literally to preserve the philosophical import more clearly; Boethius’ original used approximate rhymes throughout—approximate, because it was more the rhythm of the lines than perfect work rhymes—the rhythm is manipulated through diverse meters and styles, all heavily reliant on repetition of prose lines in the meter/poems and redirection of the prose by the meter/poems. Very shortly after the appearance of the work around 525, the copying and translation began; today, from its appearance to now, there are over 400 translations of the work.
It is typical to cite the work as, e.g.: (I.3) for Book One, Prose Three, or: (II.m.5) for Book Two, Meter/Poem Five.
Text (overview):
Philosophy, then, is consoling Boethius herein; however, this consolation is not through simple sympathy, but through reason, by showing him that true happiness is not damaged by the tremendous unhappiness that he currently feels, finding himself in jail, facing death, and fearful for the fate of his family. In fact, Lady Philosophy is a harsh “physician” or “nurse;” her message is that he has no real reason to complain. True happiness cannot be destroyed, no matter the precipitous degree of damage done to him by his capture, false accusations, slander, imprisonment, and impending torture and death.
The Consolation of Philosophy, then, is about human happiness and how to achieve it, despite and amidst suffering.
Boethius’ real circumstances set the scene for the imagined dialogue between him and Lady Philosophy. He eventually recognizes her, and she proceeds to “cure” him of his sorrow and anxiety. He is not able to take her strong medicine at first, so she begins gently, before leading him into the true cure, the bitter medicine that be found sweet, upon its digestion. Book I has her ask him recount his troubles. Book II is her “gentle” discussion of fortune, and how we esteem it as fickle, and she schools us that bad fortune is actually even better than only knowing good fortune, for only if we know the bad, can we fully understand and appreciate the good. Book III begins the bitter medicine. The end is happiness; but those goods we presume to bring us happiness are not the true causes.
Following III.m.9’s invocation to God, in terminology reminiscent of Plato’s Timaeus, III.10 introduces us to how the perfect good and perfect happiness are not in God, but are God. But, of course, this raises the philosophical problem as to whether happiness comes from merely knowing God, or, as III.11 suggests, by acting well? III.11-12: God rules the universe by being its final cause: the good that all things desire. This picture makes God wholly non-interventionalist; he presides over the well-ordered world that is well-ordered because He exists. But, what about Boethius’ earlier complaint that the powerful trample over the good, and only humans lack the order the rest of the world has? The book ends on the raising of the question of evil, which is then addressed more in the remaining two books. Book IV.1-4 argues, reminiscent of Plato’s Gorgias, that evil does not prosper, it is, instead, powerless; the good is what all desire, it is happiness; only the good are happy; the wicked are powerless because their wickedness prevents their being happy, thus makes them powerless to bring about that which they desire. Further, the good receive their reward immediately as happiness; the wicked bring about their own punishment, since want is a lack, evil is a privation of existence, thus, they lower themselves below human existence. Book IV ends with discussions of providence and fate—providence is the divine reason itself that orders all things, whereas fate is the order of things seen in the unfolding events through time; fate belongs to the mutable things and accounts for difference, whereas providence belongs to the divine mind; everything changeable is subject to fate, and fate itself is subject to providence, hence, everything is ultimately ordered and governed by providence. This leads us to Boethius’ concern in Book V: Chance … is there such a thing as chance? While Lady Philosophy has already told us no, this prompts a radical problem: if there is no chance, and Providence rules all, how can there be free will?
“But every change of fortune brings with it a certain disquiet in the soul; and this is what has caused you to lose your peace of mind”
(Boethius, Consolations, II, 1, p.17).
Bees, Serpent, and Dragons in a bestiary,
ca. 1236–75 by an unknown (likely England-based) illuminator,
The British Library, Harley 3244, fols. 58v–59
Back Ground for Book I, ff.:
Stoicism: representative figure: Epictetus (ca. 50-130 c.e.); Metaphysics: fate determines all external events; these are utterly beyond our control; what is in our control is how we react. Ethics: goal is ataraxia, mental tranquility or a state free from worry, as an apatheia, an apathy that is the absence of passion, a state free from emotional disturbance; when we do otherwise, we invite suffering; our responsibilities primarily personal, but also responsible to care for others. Epistemology: demands self-control, only possible via self-reflection (yields knowledge of what is in our power: desires (enslaving), aversions, impulses, and opinions (e.g., weeping, quarrelling, misfortune, and complaint; perfecting of our reason); what is not in our power: bodies, possessions, honor/glory, and power), hence, first study ought to be in logic, which finds: reason is good; the irrational is evil—hence, epistemology feeds ethical pursuit to perfect reason to control emotions and permit the peace of mind; greatest enemy: pleasure; the task of philosophy is to purify the self (the mind) for the end of tranquility.
Epicureanism: founder Epicurus (ca. 341-271 b.c.e.); Metaphysics: materialist; atomistic account of natural phenomenon, rejection of Platonic forms, rejection of influence of gods on our lives; Epistemology: empiricist; rejected skepticism, accepted knowledge via senses; senses reveal physical pleasure/pain to concern present and mental pleasure/pain to concern past and future, hence both must be addressed; Ethics: Hedonism; goal is best pleasure (complete, self-sufficient, hence: complete satiation possible that persists in tranquility: ataraxia), achievable by limiting desires and eliminating fear of death and of gods; “minimize harm, maximize happiness.” Provided free education in ‘The Garden;’ advocated equality of slaves and women, but rather reclusive school; promoted ascetic life so pleasures could be satisfied.
Neoplatonism: Platonism, and what it became after Plato and Aristotle’s deaths; key figure is Plotinus (204/5-270 c.e.), his Metaphysics: tripartite: the One, Intellect, and Soul; all multiplicity calls for explanation traceable back to primordial unity: material things furthest from unity, connected to it only partially by Soul; Soul knows only by active seeking, easily distracted by its lack of unity; Intellect, like the Platonic realm of the forms, holds true knowledge; key is the One: the unity of all multiplicity, the primordial, creative source of all things that is also an unity that is independent of all other beings or nonbeing. Creation by emanation: from this unity, the One, all things are derived, effects poured forth from the ultimate reality of the One (as neither completely one thing nor sum of all things); with procession, comes reversion: desire to return to the unity. Epistemology: procession weakens perfection into multiplicity, but all has partial share in Source, hence hierarchy of created things can be discerned; perfect knowing only by reunion with the One; retracing flow of emanation in reversion becomes methodology for all knowing and all actions. Ethics: dictated by epistemology, goal is reunion with the One, achieve via knowing the created so as to know Creator; thus, live by seeking godly in created; finding it, stand in awe of Creator: this awe is love: desire drives us to want to return to the One; embodied, we are torn, and must focus on the inner, rational desires to purify self to be suitable for reunion via virtues and especially beauty.
... To Focus on, Think About, in BOOK I:
Prosimetrum: the alteration of prose and verse (heavy repetition and difference between them, use of many & diverse meters and forms for verse/poems)
Dialogue: Boethius & Lady Philosophy; classic Greek (Platonic) form, dialectic;
Consolation: Latin consolatio (con-, with, + -solari, to soothe): (1) comfort received from another during a trying time or after a deep disappointment (although it can also identify the person or thing comforting one); (2) ceremonial oratory meant to provide rhetorical comfort at events like funerals; their standard form was to begin with the statement “all must die”--note: purpose is Stoic (acknowledge inevitable death so as to cease anxiety), practice is persuasion.
Imagery: key personifications (Philosophy and Fortune); heavy use of medical imagery; repeated mentions of ‘homeland,’ enslavement; frequent Greek and Neoplatonist allusions; infrequent Biblical references, almost only indirect;
- Why a Prosimetrum? Why does Lady Philosophy kick out the Muses then go on to use poetry?
- Why a dialogue? Why not explicitly Christian? How does the description of Lady Phi. speak to content?
- How is Lady Phi. both comforting and not? Is her work to console? If not, what is her aim, and why call it a consolation? If so, what is the nature of consolation and its end goal?
- Why does Lady Phi. so critique the Epicureans/Stoics, but invokes their philosophy? Is her goal ataraxia or apatheia?
- I.4: blames philosophy and Lady Philosophy for his misfortunes; Im5’s prayer (note tonal and phrasing similarity to Lord’s Prayer) implicitly blames God—who does Lady Phi. blame in I.5?
- Comparisons to Augustine’s Confessions: I.2, Im2: lethargy, medicine, bound: compare Aug. VIII; Im4: compare serene man to Aug.’s psychology of will & well-ordered soul in VIII; I.5, I.6: on memory & forgetting to such in Aug. X.
- Why try a proof (I.6)? What does it tell us philosophically and about Boethius?
Textual Analysis:
Book I:
Style: Notice, first, the form: there are prose and poem sections that alternate and it is a dialogue between Boethius and Lady Philosophy. The poems are translated, in this edition, literally in order to preserve the meaning, versus the verse, rhymes, and rhythm.
Also notice how the poetry sections summarize and introduce ideas in the prose sections; it moves the dialogue’s content along, thus, it is crucial, despite the fact that the first prose section begins with Lady Philosophy’s banishment of the “whores,” the poetic muses. Such poetry is fine for the dull-witted, she says, but not for one who is educated in philosophy, such as Boethius.
Characterization of Lady Philosophy: She is “majestic,” full of “vigor,” and indeterminate in her height and age, but her clothes (while still elegant and made herself from eternal cloth) are aged and torn. She is named the “physician” and the “nurse,” who has come once again to nourish him; and is the “mistress of all virtues.”
Medical imagery: Boethius first considers her in shock; she tells him that he suffers from “lethargy, the common illness of deceived minds” (I.2)—notice the heavy use of terms of slavery and bondage, and compare to St. Augustine’s same usage of being bound (e.g., VIII) and medical imagery. In I.4, she tells him to uncover his wound, so that she can see what she must treat. Her full diagnosis of his condition comes in I.6.
Boethius then comes to recognize her; she promises to help him; reminds him that many of her followers have faced prosecution.
As the footnote fills out, the embroidery on Philosophy’s robe is representative of the unity of true philosophy, the theoretical and the practical; and that Boethius considered most schools of thought to be limited, e.g., the Epicureans and Stoics. In the text, these schools are represented as having torn pieces of her robe away, “… ripped off some little pieces of it, went away supposing that they possessed me wholly” (p.5). Assuming these parts were wisdom itself, in its entirety, it is perhaps understandable, she suggests, that these schools brought scorn upon themselves and philosophy’s name was bedraggled.
But, notice that, despite the harsh critique of Stoicism, there are numerous instances throughout, the first, where what is upheld sounds very stoic. For example, I.m.4 (poem four) notes the “serene man” who stands above good and bad fortune; he hopes for nothing, fears nothing (p.6); in III.m.5, one should check one’s desires to not be overcome by them (p.46); and in III.12, the body and grief are notes as that which greatly occlude truth (p.62).
I.4:
Boethius ‘uncovers his wound’ and recounts why he is there, in the jail cell:
--he went into politics because of Plato’s writings that encourage the wise man to rule;
--account of his acts counter to injustice;
--his accusers: Basil, Opitio, and Gaudentius –all were expelled or banished by the King for corruption;
--accusations: -desired safety of the Senate; -hindered accuser from giving evidence against the Senate for their treason; -spurious letters charged him with hoping for “Roman liberty;” -sacrilege, out of desire for advancement;
--the worst part, acc. to Boethius: enemies believed that wisdom led to the crime of ambition; they dishonor wisdom;
--thus, he is in the jail cell, faces death, cannot answer his charges, his possessions are gone, honors are gone, reputation is slandered, he is punished because he tried to do good, and fears that his punishment will scare the good and deprive the innocent of their security and defense and embolden the evil.
I.m.4:
He concludes with a prayer—one that depicts the “well-ordered soul,” heavy with Neoplatonist tones, but also found in Augustine’s Confessions (e.g., VIII) and On Free Choice of the Will (I); here, note this order is not the Aristotelian ‘golden mean,’ but a much more ascetic version. Identifies the Creator as He who creates, directs, and maintains the order of all nature, but that humans are not restrained by His law. “Why should uncertain Fortune control our lives?” (p.12). Why does He let the innocent suffer and the wicked prevail? [Essentially asking why did God abandon us to ourselves?]
I.5:
Lady Philosophy is essentially unmoved by his recounting of his horrors. Tells him that he is the source of his troubles. “You have not been driven out of your homeland; you have willfully wandered away” (p.13).
--What do you make of the idea of “homeland” here?
She shows immense concern about the nature of his attitude and how proper attitude is necessary to be able to understand the truth of philosophy.
--Note that this is no ‘disinterested’ or entirely ‘objective’ in the sense of ‘detached’ thinking; one must be right to be able to think right and understand the truth.
I.6:
“… let me test your present attitude … so that I can decide on a way to cure you” (p.14):
Is the world subject to random chance, or governed by a rational principle?
--B: rational principle;
How is it governed?
--B: I don’t understand;
What is the end to which all things are directed?
--B: I once knew, but cannot remember;
Where do all things come from [source]?
--B: all things come from God;
[How can you know things’ origin, but not their purpose?]
Do you remember that you are a man?
--B: of course;
Define what is a man?
--B: Rational animal and mortal;
What else? Anything else?
--B: don’t know; nothing else;
Lady Philosophy: Now I know the cause of your sickness: “… you have forgotten what you are” (p.15).
--What does this mean?
Her diagnosis: You forget what you are, thus you are confused; you are upset that you are in exile and stripped of your possessions. You are ignorant of the purpose of all things, thus you think that the evil are powerful and happy. You have forgotten how the world is governed, thus suppose that the change of fortune is without purpose.
But … you think that the world is governed by a rational principle, thus, from this tiny spark we can rekindle you.
But … you are too weak yet for strong medicine; thus, I must begin gently. [end of book I]
To Focus on, Think About, in Book II:
- What are the nature and habits of Fortune (II.1-2)?
- The recollection of joys: why is memory sorrowful, and why does Lady Philosophy prompt it as beneficial (II.3-4)?
- Riches, jewels, the beauty of nature, fine clothes, honor, and power are false goods; what are the problems with all and each of them (II.5-6)?
- Explain the importance of self-knowledge and the harm of ignorance (II.5)?
- What is Lady Philosophy’s problem with public service (II.7)?
- Why is misfortune better than fortune (II.8)?
- What is the general ethical disposition being promoted by Lady Philosophy? (Consider the possible contradictions shown in II.1: keep at it, fortune can change, security comes after misfortune; II.m.2: can we ever be well-ordered?; II.5-6: the attitude to goods; II.7: withdrawal from the world?)
- Does Boethius’ portrait of good and evil accord with or differ from Augustine’s? (Consider II.1: free will; II.2: inordinate desire; II.m.2: disordered desires; II.4: what cannot be taken; II.5: what can harm cannot be good; II.6: no good in the wicked; II.7: don’t be politically involved.)
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“Go up, if you like, but only on condition that you will not feel abused when my sport requires your fall” (Boethius, Consolations, II, 2, p.20). Alexander the Great on the Wheel of Fortune, medieval illuminated manuscript |
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Textual Analysis of Book II:
II.1:
Notice the unique opening: “Philosophy was silent for a while; then, regaining my attention by her modest reserve, she said …” (II, 1, p.17). Silence, as a modest reserve, is a call to his attention. Here, the ‘speaking of silence’ serves to reawaken Boethius’ attention. What she then goes forward to speak about is Fortune (also personified); her discussions are mainly done through rhetoric and music, called the gentle treatment, which is a softer persuasion to calm the pain, and then through harsher medicine, which is more in the form of direct argument/proposition.
“But every change of fortune brings with it a certain disquiet in the soul; and this is what has caused you to lose your peace of mind” (II, 1, p.17). This claim is one from Stoicism; ataraxia, mental tranquility is the goal, and fortune upsets it, thus, upsets the well-ordered soul. However, Lady Philosophy clarifies that the change of fortune is only how it seems … for Fortune (now capitalized, personified as Lady Fortune) has not changed towards Boethius, but only revealed her true nature. She is described as changeable, a two-faced goddess, and blind (in II, m1, she is also described as deaf).*
“Really, the misfortunes which are now such a cause of grief ought to be reasons for tranquility. For now she has deserted you, and no man can ever be secure until he has been forsaken by Fortune” (II, 1, p.18). This idea is the key one throughout this book and will be repeated and explained at length.* It is, however, terribly problematic: must one be ‘burned’ by fortune in order to attain tranquility? This would then suggest that one perhaps ought to court risk and failure, which is the antithesis of the Epicurean and Stoic ethics.
At the end of this prose piece, we get the famous image of Fortune’s wheel. Boethius did not invent this image, but certainly popularized it. We can find it earliest in Babylonian and then Pythagorean writings from about the 2nd c. wherein it had connections to astronomy and astrology; a key feature was the insight of the stars as both in motion and fixed (like the wheel to spokes to hub, there is a fixity, yet the whole that is fixed also turns), and this was interpreted as both physical and metaphysical: scientific, but also indicative of fate, destiny.
II.m1:
This poem paints Fortune as a cruel mistress: “She neither hears nor cares about the tears of those in misery; with a hard heart she laughs at the pain she causes” (II, m.1, p.19).
II.2:
Notice the intensity of the perspectival shift from Fortune as monster (II.1) to Fortune as coldly practical, but with a logical justness. Here, Lady Philosophy speaks as would Fortune, showing Fortune’s case to be perfectly right, and how Boethius would have no good complaint or argument against her. The main point herein is that honors and riches, all things of fortune, do not belong to mortals, but to her, Fortune; she grants them when she wishes and is in full right to recall them when she wishes, too.
“Shall I, then, permit man’s insatiable cupidity to tie me down to a sameness alien to my habits” (II, 2, p.19)? It is human libido, then, the inordinate desire, lust, or cupidity, that makes us susceptible to, prey to, the wounds by Fortune.*
Here, we get a longer description of Fortune as a wheel: “Here is the source of my power, the game I always play: I spin my wheel and find pleasure in raising the low to a high place and lowering those who were on top” (II, 2, pp.19-20).
Her following lines offer the moral: “Go up, if you like, but only on condition that you will not feel abused when my sport requires your fall” (II, 2, p.20). Notice the language in both passages: power, game, play, spin, pleasure, low, high, sport. The game, then, has conditions; one must be prepared for defeat if one hopes for victory.
Here, though, the cruel casting of Fortune turns to hope in a bitter package: “What if I have not destroyed you completely? What if my very mutability gives you reason to hope that your fortunes will improve” (II, 2, p.20)? This Fortune is a wheel … it continues to spin; this risk gives, at once, hope. But, the question is whether, when she says “… do not lose heart,” we should take this to mean keep playing or abandon the wheel altogether to seek mental tranquility? Or, is it only by playing and falling that we will attain the right attitude by which to accept the conditions of possible failure, and thus not feel the losses as devastations? So, is this stoic-like encouragement a ridding the self of all desires, an apatheia, or just a best and tight control of desires, an ataraxia?
II.m2:
“No bridle can restrain man’s disordered desires within reasonable bounds” (II, m.2, p.20). Does this answer the last question? Or, is it just poetic flourish? If no bridle, then, is no rational part of the soul capable of conquering any base, desiring, appetitive part of the soul? Can this even be read as a diagnosis of human nature … this would violate the premise of emanation theory (that everything is good), but the absolutism herein could invoke such argument.
II.3:
Boethius admits that the gentle treatment did ease his pain, but only while she was speaking the words; “Those in misery have a more profound awareness of their afflictions, and therefore a deep-seated pain continues long after the music stops” (II, 3, p.21). So, Lady Philosophy turns to stronger medicine.
First, her turn is to recount and thus remind him of what he has to be joyful for, with the idea that in remembrance, he cannot be at once completely miserable. These joys include: he was adopted after he lost his father, he has a loving, chaste wife, and fine sons, and received many honors when young; he saw his sons made Consuls and acclaimed by the people.
Lady Philosophy then scolds him that he received more fortunes than most, and more than his sorrows, and this is the first time he has felt misfortune.
II.m3:
“One thing is certain, fixed by eternal law: nothing that is born can last” (II, m.3, p.22). Note, here, that this last clause is very similar to the traditional opening to ‘consolations’ as the rhetorical speeches given at events like funerals or memorials. It also bears resemblance to Ecclesiastes.
II.4:
Boethius declares the worst sorrow to be in the remembrance of lost joys—this is a most interesting topic, the role of memory in sorrow and joy, and remembrance as the source of regret. What philosophical value does exploration into the idea of regret promise?*
Lady Philosophy then repeats a list of gifts, this time to show what it is he still has that is so great: his father-in-law, wife, and sons. At least, he doesn’t “have” them, but has the idea that they are unharmed (was this really true? Not likely). “The greatest concern of mortals is to preserve life, and you still possess things which everyone agrees are dearer than life itself” (II.4, p.23).* Curious she is citing things, rather than skipping this in her otherwise insistence on the eternal.
“Anxiety is the necessary condition of human happiness since happiness is never completely achieved and never permanently kept” (II.4, p.23).—here, I think we must stress “human” happiness, since the greatest happiness is to be, precisely, in things we cannot lose against our will. However, this is deeply problematized by Book III’s purification and unification of all these “false goods” into “partial goods” and then constitutive of the “true good,” which is happiness, which is God … the problem: if anxiety is connected to these human goods, and these goods are constitutive of the true good, is not anxiety then necessary en route to the true good? If so, this violates the Epicurean/Stoic/Boetheian insistence on the goal and thereby greatest good of tranquility.
Consider the last paragraph carefully.* She begins with the rhetorical question of why we look outside when the greatest lies within, but then proceeds to focus on the “self” in such a way that ‘living’ seems integral, and yet one’s ‘life’ can certainly be taken away (as Boethius himself shortly here after experienced).
II.5:
Lady Philosophy’s recount of how material goods are not good at all in themselves.
One of her arguments against their beauty being their value—“They are not precious because you have them; you desire to have them because they seem precious”—is reminiscent of Socrates’ critique of one of Euthyphro’s definitions of piety in the Euthyphro (do the gods love piety, thus making piety good, or do the gods love piety because piety is already good?).
Also note the utter necessity placed upon self-knowledge. Its lack is named as vice.
Lady Philosophy, against the goodness of material goods, adds: “Moreover, I deny that anything can be considered good which harms the one who has it” (II.5, p.27).*
This poem hearkens the idea of there once being a golden age in the past, and does so with reference to those who are content with “acorns,” which is a reference to the first telling of the perfect city by Socrates in the start of Plato’s Republic … he is then forced to make a less utopic, more practical ideal city because his interlocutors refuse the joys of eating acorns for dessert, and demand other things, like wine and honey, and such.*
Lady Philosophy’s recount of how honor and power are not good at all in themselves.
Lady Philosophy, against the goodness of power and honor, adds: “… [if they] were by nature good in themselves, they would never be found in wicked men” (II, 6, p.30).*
Note the interesting remark about the cause of our mistaking power and honor for goods is language: our misuse of language, to be precise.
II.7:
Boethius tries to argue that he bemoans his losses not for the things themselves, but that he had wanted to virtuously serve the public. What follows is a most remarkable argument against the goods of public service: “… this is the only ambition which can attract minds which are excellent by nature but have not yet achieved perfect virtue” (II, 7, p.31). She then launches into an argument about how shallow and limited such glory is, how trivial and how empty. How we need external validation, and this shows how pathetic we really are to long for this public dimension of honor and power. (And, tells a joke about a philosopher who seeks validation.) The point she builds to and ends on is how the soul, fully aware of its virtue, when freed from earthly restraints, is elated to be free of such trivial matters.
The oddity, however, is a question as to the extent of the asceticism thus promoted here: is there truly no good in and no necessary responsibility for the wise to serve the public? Ought we, instead, really become hermits or anchors?
Perhaps this raises an interesting debate within Plato: in the Apology, Socrates says the philosopher (and he) must always remain out of the public governance, for the public will kill the philosopher; in the Republic and Timaeus, however, there is the strong promotion of the necessity for the wisest to be the rulers, and for the wise to work to the harmony of the whole (through all means).
II.8:
In this final prose piece we have the developed expression of Lady Philosophy’s claim that misfortune is better than fortune. In essence: misfortune teaches us, frees us, leads to the good, and reveals our true friends.
II.m8:
Is it not a little odd to end this book with a poem about love?
Love, truly, is the principle of harmony—although, what is this harmony, truly? It is a precarious love for more thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius) than it is a comfortable, peaceful one. Love is the explanation for creation (it is the principle of causation, it is by love and through love that God brought all that is into being) and the explanation for our desire to return to the One, hence, making death not a bad thing. Love is also critically important to emanation theory (desire/love drives God’s creation, is in the nature of all created things, responsible for creation desiring to return back to God).
Also note the last line … Boethius is complaining … as if blaming God: why don’t you order us like your love orders everything else in the universe? (i.e., ‘I don’t want free will if this suffering is its price!’)
II.1:
Notice the unique opening: “Philosophy was silent for a while; then, regaining my attention by her modest reserve, she said …” (II, 1, p.17). Silence, as a modest reserve, is a call to his attention. Here, the ‘speaking of silence’ serves to reawaken Boethius’ attention. What she then goes forward to speak about is Fortune (also personified); her discussions are mainly done through rhetoric and music, called the gentle treatment, which is a softer persuasion to calm the pain, and then through harsher medicine, which is more in the form of direct argument/proposition.
“But every change of fortune brings with it a certain disquiet in the soul; and this is what has caused you to lose your peace of mind” (II, 1, p.17). This claim is one from Stoicism; ataraxia, mental tranquility is the goal, and fortune upsets it, thus, upsets the well-ordered soul. However, Lady Philosophy clarifies that the change of fortune is only how it seems … for Fortune (now capitalized, personified as Lady Fortune) has not changed towards Boethius, but only revealed her true nature. She is described as changeable, a two-faced goddess, and blind (in II, m1, she is also described as deaf).*
- * Notice that the depiction as changeable is a parallel to Augustine’s description of temporal things (cf. either On Free Choice of the Will [OFCW], I, or Confessions, II, XI). Also: “two-faced” likely recalls to mind the Roman god Janus, the god of beginnings, passages, endings, almost always depicted as having two faces, one looking to the future, one to the past; he also represented the start and end of wars, hence, the transitionary figure between war and peace.
“Really, the misfortunes which are now such a cause of grief ought to be reasons for tranquility. For now she has deserted you, and no man can ever be secure until he has been forsaken by Fortune” (II, 1, p.18). This idea is the key one throughout this book and will be repeated and explained at length.* It is, however, terribly problematic: must one be ‘burned’ by fortune in order to attain tranquility? This would then suggest that one perhaps ought to court risk and failure, which is the antithesis of the Epicurean and Stoic ethics.
- * There is another interesting parallel to draw to Augustine here, too: about the will. “If you were to wish for a law to control the comings and goings of one whom you have freely taken for your mistress, you would be unjust and your impatience would merely aggravate a condition which you cannot change” (II, 1, p.18). Consider Book I of Augustine’s On Free Choice of the Will, wherein he uses the example of the evil act of adultery so as to identify the definition of and explanation for why it is evil: inordinate desire. This desire, however, overpowers one and the will ‘freely’ (albeit overpowered) chooses evil. The question of justice is held against will throughout the Book. Here, Boethius, too, is using the idea of a love relation and justice. For both, we cannot have this choice be free and an absolutely controlling at once.
At the end of this prose piece, we get the famous image of Fortune’s wheel. Boethius did not invent this image, but certainly popularized it. We can find it earliest in Babylonian and then Pythagorean writings from about the 2nd c. wherein it had connections to astronomy and astrology; a key feature was the insight of the stars as both in motion and fixed (like the wheel to spokes to hub, there is a fixity, yet the whole that is fixed also turns), and this was interpreted as both physical and metaphysical: scientific, but also indicative of fate, destiny.
II.m1:
This poem paints Fortune as a cruel mistress: “She neither hears nor cares about the tears of those in misery; with a hard heart she laughs at the pain she causes” (II, m.1, p.19).
II.2:
Notice the intensity of the perspectival shift from Fortune as monster (II.1) to Fortune as coldly practical, but with a logical justness. Here, Lady Philosophy speaks as would Fortune, showing Fortune’s case to be perfectly right, and how Boethius would have no good complaint or argument against her. The main point herein is that honors and riches, all things of fortune, do not belong to mortals, but to her, Fortune; she grants them when she wishes and is in full right to recall them when she wishes, too.
“Shall I, then, permit man’s insatiable cupidity to tie me down to a sameness alien to my habits” (II, 2, p.19)? It is human libido, then, the inordinate desire, lust, or cupidity, that makes us susceptible to, prey to, the wounds by Fortune.*
- * Another linkage to Augustine’s On the Free Choice of the Will: “the reign of lust rages tyrannically and distracts the life and whole spirit of man with many conflicting storms of terror, desire, anxiety, empty and false happiness, torture because of the loss of something that he used to love, eagerness to possess what he does not have, grievances for injuries received, and fires of vengeance (OFCW, Bk.I). Or Confessions’ “muddy cravings of the flesh” (C., II.1), or “This [conversion, faith] was just what I longed for myself, but I was held back, and I was held back not by fetters put on me by someone else, but by the iron bondage of my own will. The enemy [libido] held my will and made a chain out of it and bound me with it. From a perverse will came lust, and slavery to lust became a necessity. These were like links, hanging each to each (which is why I called it a chain), and they held me fast in a hard slavery” and “the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh …” (C., VIII.5).
Here, we get a longer description of Fortune as a wheel: “Here is the source of my power, the game I always play: I spin my wheel and find pleasure in raising the low to a high place and lowering those who were on top” (II, 2, pp.19-20).
Her following lines offer the moral: “Go up, if you like, but only on condition that you will not feel abused when my sport requires your fall” (II, 2, p.20). Notice the language in both passages: power, game, play, spin, pleasure, low, high, sport. The game, then, has conditions; one must be prepared for defeat if one hopes for victory.
Here, though, the cruel casting of Fortune turns to hope in a bitter package: “What if I have not destroyed you completely? What if my very mutability gives you reason to hope that your fortunes will improve” (II, 2, p.20)? This Fortune is a wheel … it continues to spin; this risk gives, at once, hope. But, the question is whether, when she says “… do not lose heart,” we should take this to mean keep playing or abandon the wheel altogether to seek mental tranquility? Or, is it only by playing and falling that we will attain the right attitude by which to accept the conditions of possible failure, and thus not feel the losses as devastations? So, is this stoic-like encouragement a ridding the self of all desires, an apatheia, or just a best and tight control of desires, an ataraxia?
II.m2:
“No bridle can restrain man’s disordered desires within reasonable bounds” (II, m.2, p.20). Does this answer the last question? Or, is it just poetic flourish? If no bridle, then, is no rational part of the soul capable of conquering any base, desiring, appetitive part of the soul? Can this even be read as a diagnosis of human nature … this would violate the premise of emanation theory (that everything is good), but the absolutism herein could invoke such argument.
II.3:
Boethius admits that the gentle treatment did ease his pain, but only while she was speaking the words; “Those in misery have a more profound awareness of their afflictions, and therefore a deep-seated pain continues long after the music stops” (II, 3, p.21). So, Lady Philosophy turns to stronger medicine.
First, her turn is to recount and thus remind him of what he has to be joyful for, with the idea that in remembrance, he cannot be at once completely miserable. These joys include: he was adopted after he lost his father, he has a loving, chaste wife, and fine sons, and received many honors when young; he saw his sons made Consuls and acclaimed by the people.
Lady Philosophy then scolds him that he received more fortunes than most, and more than his sorrows, and this is the first time he has felt misfortune.
II.m3:
“One thing is certain, fixed by eternal law: nothing that is born can last” (II, m.3, p.22). Note, here, that this last clause is very similar to the traditional opening to ‘consolations’ as the rhetorical speeches given at events like funerals or memorials. It also bears resemblance to Ecclesiastes.
II.4:
Boethius declares the worst sorrow to be in the remembrance of lost joys—this is a most interesting topic, the role of memory in sorrow and joy, and remembrance as the source of regret. What philosophical value does exploration into the idea of regret promise?*
- * Recall Augustine’s Confessions: “how shall I find you if I do not remember you” (X, 17), and all of Bk.X’s philosophy of memory.
Lady Philosophy then repeats a list of gifts, this time to show what it is he still has that is so great: his father-in-law, wife, and sons. At least, he doesn’t “have” them, but has the idea that they are unharmed (was this really true? Not likely). “The greatest concern of mortals is to preserve life, and you still possess things which everyone agrees are dearer than life itself” (II.4, p.23).* Curious she is citing things, rather than skipping this in her otherwise insistence on the eternal.
- * Compare this last remark with Augustine’s OFCW: evil is a turning away from the eternal things to the temporal things.
“Anxiety is the necessary condition of human happiness since happiness is never completely achieved and never permanently kept” (II.4, p.23).—here, I think we must stress “human” happiness, since the greatest happiness is to be, precisely, in things we cannot lose against our will. However, this is deeply problematized by Book III’s purification and unification of all these “false goods” into “partial goods” and then constitutive of the “true good,” which is happiness, which is God … the problem: if anxiety is connected to these human goods, and these goods are constitutive of the true good, is not anxiety then necessary en route to the true good? If so, this violates the Epicurean/Stoic/Boetheian insistence on the goal and thereby greatest good of tranquility.
Consider the last paragraph carefully.* She begins with the rhetorical question of why we look outside when the greatest lies within, but then proceeds to focus on the “self” in such a way that ‘living’ seems integral, and yet one’s ‘life’ can certainly be taken away (as Boethius himself shortly here after experienced).
- * here we get the formulation similar to Augustine about the Good being that which cannot be taken away against one’s will … but, it is sketched in an unusual fashion, with the idea of the self as the most precious.
II.5:
Lady Philosophy’s recount of how material goods are not good at all in themselves.
One of her arguments against their beauty being their value—“They are not precious because you have them; you desire to have them because they seem precious”—is reminiscent of Socrates’ critique of one of Euthyphro’s definitions of piety in the Euthyphro (do the gods love piety, thus making piety good, or do the gods love piety because piety is already good?).
Also note the utter necessity placed upon self-knowledge. Its lack is named as vice.
Lady Philosophy, against the goodness of material goods, adds: “Moreover, I deny that anything can be considered good which harms the one who has it” (II.5, p.27).*
- * A curious contrast to Augustine, wherein just because one CAN do evil with free will, this does not prevent the will from being good.
This poem hearkens the idea of there once being a golden age in the past, and does so with reference to those who are content with “acorns,” which is a reference to the first telling of the perfect city by Socrates in the start of Plato’s Republic … he is then forced to make a less utopic, more practical ideal city because his interlocutors refuse the joys of eating acorns for dessert, and demand other things, like wine and honey, and such.*
- * “But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.
[Socrates:] “True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish-salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.
“Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?
“But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.
“Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style” (Plato, Republic, Book II). Hence, Socrates’ ‘ideal’ city is dismissed as a mere city of pigs, for its greatest luxury is merely acorns; as Glaucon insists on luxury, Socrates shows how its introduction moves the ideal city into the luxurious one, hence degrades the ideal.
Lady Philosophy’s recount of how honor and power are not good at all in themselves.
Lady Philosophy, against the goodness of power and honor, adds: “… [if they] were by nature good in themselves, they would never be found in wicked men” (II, 6, p.30).*
- * In Augustine’s OFCW, will is good, be it in a good or bad person; also, a just law can come from an unjust ruler.
Note the interesting remark about the cause of our mistaking power and honor for goods is language: our misuse of language, to be precise.
II.7:
Boethius tries to argue that he bemoans his losses not for the things themselves, but that he had wanted to virtuously serve the public. What follows is a most remarkable argument against the goods of public service: “… this is the only ambition which can attract minds which are excellent by nature but have not yet achieved perfect virtue” (II, 7, p.31). She then launches into an argument about how shallow and limited such glory is, how trivial and how empty. How we need external validation, and this shows how pathetic we really are to long for this public dimension of honor and power. (And, tells a joke about a philosopher who seeks validation.) The point she builds to and ends on is how the soul, fully aware of its virtue, when freed from earthly restraints, is elated to be free of such trivial matters.
The oddity, however, is a question as to the extent of the asceticism thus promoted here: is there truly no good in and no necessary responsibility for the wise to serve the public? Ought we, instead, really become hermits or anchors?
Perhaps this raises an interesting debate within Plato: in the Apology, Socrates says the philosopher (and he) must always remain out of the public governance, for the public will kill the philosopher; in the Republic and Timaeus, however, there is the strong promotion of the necessity for the wisest to be the rulers, and for the wise to work to the harmony of the whole (through all means).
II.8:
In this final prose piece we have the developed expression of Lady Philosophy’s claim that misfortune is better than fortune. In essence: misfortune teaches us, frees us, leads to the good, and reveals our true friends.
II.m8:
Is it not a little odd to end this book with a poem about love?
Love, truly, is the principle of harmony—although, what is this harmony, truly? It is a precarious love for more thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius) than it is a comfortable, peaceful one. Love is the explanation for creation (it is the principle of causation, it is by love and through love that God brought all that is into being) and the explanation for our desire to return to the One, hence, making death not a bad thing. Love is also critically important to emanation theory (desire/love drives God’s creation, is in the nature of all created things, responsible for creation desiring to return back to God).
Also note the last line … Boethius is complaining … as if blaming God: why don’t you order us like your love orders everything else in the universe? (i.e., ‘I don’t want free will if this suffering is its price!’)
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“One thing is certain, fixed by eternal law: nothing that is born can last” (Boethius, Consolations, II, m.3, p.22). A Caladrius Bird, ca. 1278–1300, possibly in Thérouanne, France; The J. Paul Getty Museum, Ms. Ludwig XV 4, fol. 74. |
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Book III in Summary:
(III.1) This is the bitter medicine that becomes sweet upon digestion; it is about True Happiness.
(III.2) Delineates True Happiness and False Goods:
(III.3-8) Closely explains the false goods: Riches, Honor, Power, Fame, Pleasure.
A few key ideas to note:
(III.9) True Happiness (described through the unification of all the false-goods-cum-partial-goods):
The sufficient has no lack, thus it has power à sufficient = power à such is worthy of honor à ‘honor’ is ‘to revere’ à sufficient = power = reverence à such must also be famous (for it has no need of fame given what it is) à sufficient = power = reverence = fame à such must be pleasant and joyful à sufficient = power = reverence = fame = pleasurable à hence, different names, but all one thing.
“Human depravity, then, has broken into fragments that which is by nature one and simple” (III.9). To ‘get them all at once’ is to reach “for the height of happiness” (III.9). So … “you must now learn where to look for true happiness” (III.9).
(III.10) Whether, Where, and What is The Good?
Whether such a perfect good can exist? Answer: It LOGICALLY must …
Where does such a perfect good reside? Answer: In God
What is such a perfect good? Answer: In = Is
DEDUCTION: (works from the conclusion of (iii) above to further reduce principles to get same conclusion)
(III.11) Unity
Since the above proves goods to be good by their participation in The Good, we confirm that Good = One.
Applying this principle to human life, we find that:
All as One = lives; Cease to be one = dies.
Will & Nature: all desire to live (we have a will to live); nature designs each for survival; what is natural aids survival and desire to live; hence, desire to live is from the principles of nature (as we can see that preservation of life is sometimes even against one’s own will).
Thus: Seeking and Enduring Survival = Desire to be One.
Applying this back to the argument’s rational conclusion:
Hence: one = unity = goodness. This allows us to assert that, by the fact that The Good is desired by all, Good = telos (our ultimate end/purpose).
(III.12) Remembrance of How the World is Governed: (All of the above caused Boethius to remember this; cf. I.6)
World unity could not be without the One to gather together Diversity, and to sustain it, and to do so without being changed by it. Hence: we call this “God.”
Sufficiency is part of Happiness; God is Absolute Happiness; Hence: God is Self-Sufficient; Hence: God is absolute good; Hence: God is wheel & rudder; Hence: all moves naturally and by will to the Good; Hence: All accept and freely submit as agreeable and obedient subjects (not as willing slaves, but as a system designed for the welfare of compliant citizens); Hence: By Nature, none strive to oppose God; Hence: God rules firmly and sweetly disposes all; But … what then about evil?*
- *III.3: Desire is a lack (a privation, creating a want of something ruins self-sufficiency)
- **III.4-6: Harsh critique of public opinion (almost existential critique of falling prey to the fickle public, that which changes its evaluation on whim … mob not wrong itself, but your joining/relying on a mob mentality is)
- IIIm5: Stoic ethic promoted
- III.8: Anti-Body sentiment (striking how creation is good, even the false goods become partial goods and The Good, but the body still deemed vile and vicious)
(III.9) True Happiness (described through the unification of all the false-goods-cum-partial-goods):
The sufficient has no lack, thus it has power à sufficient = power à such is worthy of honor à ‘honor’ is ‘to revere’ à sufficient = power = reverence à such must also be famous (for it has no need of fame given what it is) à sufficient = power = reverence = fame à such must be pleasant and joyful à sufficient = power = reverence = fame = pleasurable à hence, different names, but all one thing.
“Human depravity, then, has broken into fragments that which is by nature one and simple” (III.9). To ‘get them all at once’ is to reach “for the height of happiness” (III.9). So … “you must now learn where to look for true happiness” (III.9).
(III.10) Whether, Where, and What is The Good?
Whether such a perfect good can exist? Answer: It LOGICALLY must …
- (a) “Fountain:”* Reference is asserting emanation theory as the cosmological and creative truth.
- * Poem two has three examples of reversion back to one’s natural course & ends on emanation theory’s procession & reversion: “Thus all things seek again their proper course, and rejoice when they return to them. The only stable order in things is that which connects the beginning to the end and keeps itself on a steady course” (IIIm2). Poem nine delineates many attributes of God, connects beauty and order, establishes hierarchy, talks of the divided return (divided from the One in procession, and returns to the One in reversion).
- * Poem two has three examples of reversion back to one’s natural course & ends on emanation theory’s procession & reversion: “Thus all things seek again their proper course, and rejoice when they return to them. The only stable order in things is that which connects the beginning to the end and keeps itself on a steady course” (IIIm2). Poem nine delineates many attributes of God, connects beauty and order, establishes hierarchy, talks of the divided return (divided from the One in procession, and returns to the One in reversion).
- (b) “No one can deny that …:” Point (a) proved logically by the idea of perfection: IF I find X to be imperfect, THEN there must be an X2 that IS perfect.*
- * Otherwise … how would I know what perfection is that this X has failed in achieving? Even if I deem X1 to be perfect, I am deeming it such by reference to some idea of perfection, and it follows that there can be other Xs that are not perfect. Also, e.g., ‘X’ as current reality that led to his unjust imprisonment … its injustice means it is not perfect, but shows there must be a perfect form.
- * Otherwise … how would I know what perfection is that this X has failed in achieving? Even if I deem X1 to be perfect, I am deeming it such by reference to some idea of perfection, and it follows that there can be other Xs that are not perfect. Also, e.g., ‘X’ as current reality that led to his unjust imprisonment … its injustice means it is not perfect, but shows there must be a perfect form.
- (c) Origin/Fall: The origin is the fountain source that is perfect; all (creation) that is, is a fall from this origin to its presently weak (partial, divided) state.*
- * Notice how easy it would have been to argue this by referencing Scripture (e.g., Garden of Eden, original sin, “From him and to him are all things” (Romans 11:36)), or Presocratics, Plato, or Neoplatonist theory (e.g., Pythagoras’ cosmos’s creation through division of monad and dyad; Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides; Plato’s nephew Speusippus who codified the ‘esoteric reading’ of Plato, Plotinus or Philo of Judea who both expounded this process, Proclus’s claim “Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and returns to it,” (The Elements of Theology, nos. 35, 38), etc.)—instead, Boethius cites no one, and tries to prove emanation through logic alone.
- * Notice how easy it would have been to argue this by referencing Scripture (e.g., Garden of Eden, original sin, “From him and to him are all things” (Romans 11:36)), or Presocratics, Plato, or Neoplatonist theory (e.g., Pythagoras’ cosmos’s creation through division of monad and dyad; Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides; Plato’s nephew Speusippus who codified the ‘esoteric reading’ of Plato, Plotinus or Philo of Judea who both expounded this process, Proclus’s claim “Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and returns to it,” (The Elements of Theology, nos. 35, 38), etc.)—instead, Boethius cites no one, and tries to prove emanation through logic alone.
Where does such a perfect good reside? Answer: In God
- (a) Common conception says God is good, the above argument rationally proves God’s goodness to be perfect; hence, Good is good à God is best … reason heightens “good” to superlative.
- (b) Further: we avoid an infinite regress by naming whatever is superlative “God.”
- (c) Hence: God’s perfection = good’s perfection = true happiness … hence: perfect good IN God.
What is such a perfect good? Answer: In = Is
- (a) Highest good is IN God, God is “full” of it, but what is it? Creates a logical problem:
- (i) God cannot receive the good because He is the superlative.*
- * If God is mere receiver of The Good, where did it come from? If it completes Him, its creator must be more superlative in power than the superlative that is God. If He lacked it before receiving it, not only would He have not been omnipotent before, He also would not have been omnibenevolent, thus, upon receipt, He would have been changed, and thus also not eternal and unchanging, etc.
- (ii) God cannot have the good by nature.*
- * God cannot have The Good by nature because this suggests that He (His existence) is something other than His nature (His essence), which would mean He is composed of parts, hence not the true One; further, any difference between His existence & essence would show imperfection, hence show one not being the perfected unity of The Good.
- * God cannot have The Good by nature because this suggests that He (His existence) is something other than His nature (His essence), which would mean He is composed of parts, hence not the true One; further, any difference between His existence & essence would show imperfection, hence show one not being the perfected unity of The Good.
- (iii) Hence, God IS the highest good (i.e., The Good IN God à The Good IS God).
- (i) God cannot receive the good because He is the superlative.*
DEDUCTION: (works from the conclusion of (iii) above to further reduce principles to get same conclusion)
- (a) Become Divine:
- (i) Become happy by acquiring happiness; happiness is divinity; become happy by becoming divine.
- (ii) One who is happy is a god; God is one by essence; there are many gods by participation.
- (b) The One is One and Many: (works in parallel to (a))
- (i) Happiness seems composed of parts: are each goods (many) or all The Good (one)?
- (ii) All goods are The One Good (cf. III.9)
- (iii) Since The One is One and Many, The Good is the cause & the sum of all that is sought.
- (c) Become Divine:
- (iv) Thus: Good = happiness
- (v) And: Happiness = God
- (vi) Hence, starting conclusion is again our conclusion: become happy = become God
(III.11) Unity
Since the above proves goods to be good by their participation in The Good, we confirm that Good = One.
Applying this principle to human life, we find that:
All as One = lives; Cease to be one = dies.
Will & Nature: all desire to live (we have a will to live); nature designs each for survival; what is natural aids survival and desire to live; hence, desire to live is from the principles of nature (as we can see that preservation of life is sometimes even against one’s own will).
Thus: Seeking and Enduring Survival = Desire to be One.
Applying this back to the argument’s rational conclusion:
Hence: one = unity = goodness. This allows us to assert that, by the fact that The Good is desired by all, Good = telos (our ultimate end/purpose).
(III.12) Remembrance of How the World is Governed: (All of the above caused Boethius to remember this; cf. I.6)
World unity could not be without the One to gather together Diversity, and to sustain it, and to do so without being changed by it. Hence: we call this “God.”
Sufficiency is part of Happiness; God is Absolute Happiness; Hence: God is Self-Sufficient; Hence: God is absolute good; Hence: God is wheel & rudder; Hence: all moves naturally and by will to the Good; Hence: All accept and freely submit as agreeable and obedient subjects (not as willing slaves, but as a system designed for the welfare of compliant citizens); Hence: By Nature, none strive to oppose God; Hence: God rules firmly and sweetly disposes all; But … what then about evil?*
- * This introduces Bk.IV, but … Note IIIm12 on Orpheus: His sorrow moved hell to feel pity; hell gave back Eurydice, his wife, but with a law: do not look back. But who can give lovers a law? Love is a stronger law. Orpheus looks back; he loses Eurydice. Fable’s moral: Seekers will be conquered when they turn their eyes to hell, and will lose all the excellence they had gained.
Textual Analysis ~ ~ Book III:
III.1:
Philosophy moves to the stronger medicine; says it will taste bitter at first, but then, as he digests it, it will be sweet. This medicine will lead him to true happiness.
She will first instruct him in what he knows, that is, in the false cases, in the opposite of goal, so that he can then clearly see the truth.
III.2:
The supreme good: Happiness.
- Once it is attained, one has no more desires;
- Contains within it, all the lesser goods; it lacks nothing;
- Perfect happiness = the perfect state in which all goods are possessed;
- All humans aim to attain perfect happiness;
- Happiness as goal is implanted in all minds naturally;
- Foolish error draws humans to false goods.
- Some think it is to have:
- Have everything --> thus aim to become rich;
- Found in highest honor --> thus aim to gain esteem of others through getting honors;
- Personal power --> aim to be ruler or associate with rulers;
- Glory of one’s name --> spread it through warring or making peace;
- Pleasure --> seek gaiety and enjoyment.
- Some use some of these to get others, e.g., seek power for money or fame.
Range of human happiness: riches, honor, power, fame, pleasure.
Human soul seeks to return to its true good, but, like the drunk who has forgotten his way home, the soul no longer knows the true good (pp.39-40).
Are these pursuits wholly wrong or mistaken? NO. (--what do we take this to mean?)
What humans desire: riches, high rank, administrative authority, glory and pleasure because they think that these will lead to a good standard of living, honor, power, fame, and joy.
III.m.2:
Carthaginian Lions: “tamed” until they taste blood and revert to being vicious and wild; nature revived in them.
Caged Birds: “tamed” until they can escape, and then fly free and sing freely.
Tree with pressure bending its boughs: bends low only until the load is freed, then reverts.
All things will revert to their natural states; all things seek to regain their proper courses; and all things rejoice when they return to these natural ways of being.
III.3: Riches never satisfy
Nature inclines all to good; error deceives all with partial goods.
Wealth is never satisfying.
Philosophy asks Boethius, you were recently rich, did you worry?
- --B: always worried;
All LACK what one wants.
“… the man who lacks something [is] less than wholly self-sufficient” (p.42).
“Then wealth cannot give a man everything and make him entirely self-sufficient, even though that is what money seems to promise” (p.42). Instead, riches make one dependent on the help of others. Riches do not drive away needs; those remain. And avarice is never satisfied. Instead, money produces new wants.
III.4: Honor never satisfies
High public office seems an honor and seems to make one worthy of reverence, but it does not. Instead, honor usually reveals wickedness (power corrupts or makes public what could have been hidden).
Virtue has its own honor; this honor is transferred only to those who have virtue. Only this has the beauty of true honor.
--Notice in here the very, very low regard paid to public opinion – this is an almost existential critique of the masses – but, this first critical passage is more Sartrean than Kierkegaardian, it is more about the fickle public who changes its evaluation, more than the negative public opinion meaning the mob itself is negative and unworthy. [But, Aristotle often had doxa, public opinion, as mistaken and Plato often suspicious of the whole, re: Apology]
III.5: Power never satisfies
The powerful lack security (sword of Damocles).
III.m.5:
Check desires so as to not be overrun by them
III.6: Fame never satisfies
False opinion of masses, again. See above. “… mere popularity is [is not] even worth mentioning since it does not rest on good judgment nor has it any lasting life” (p.47).
Nobility, or gaining one’s name through family, is worth even less.
III.7: Bodily pleasures never satisfy
Ascetic! “The appetite for them is full of worry, and the fulfillment full of remorse. What dreadful disease and intolerable sorrow, the fruits of wickedness, they bring to the bodies of those who enjoy them!” (p.47).
Bodily pleasures always end in misery. Make men into beasts; slaves to bodily pleasures. Children may be thought of as joys, but they cause sorrow and suffering.
III.8: limited goods cannot bring happiness
Summation:
- Money: to accumulate it, you deprive others of it;
- Honors: make you indebted to others; humiliate yourself trying to outdo others;
- Power: makes you open to others’ treachery;
- Fame: lose your security;
- Pleasure: “… but who would not spurn and avoid subjection to so vile and fragile a thing as his body? Indeed those who boast of bodily goods are relying on weak and uncertain possessions. For you are not bigger than an elephant, nor stronger than a bull, nor as quick as a tiger” (pp.48-9).
Fix yourself on stability and not base things.
Beauty of bodies passes : as Aristotle said, if men had the eyes of Lynceus and could see through walls, we would find the beauty of Alcibiades vile when seeing his entrails.
- --Note: the reference to Alcibiades does make a good example of how beauty brings danger; but, is the asceticism overall re: beauty and bodies a little too much? Has he forgotten the Platonic ladder of love?
III.9:
Takes up true happiness, the supreme good.
Why have we messed up happiness by these false goods?
“What nature has made simple and indivisible, human error has divided and changed from true and perfect to false and imperfect” (p.50).
One without lack has no need of power.
The deficient need outside help.
Sufficiency and power have one and the same nature.
Thing which is perfectly self-sufficient and powerful is worthy of honor.
Reverence, Power, and Sufficiency are one and the same.
Something with R, P, and S are famous and renowned; thus, fame is the same as the other three.
What is these four things can do anything by its own power and is honored and famous, thus it is pleasant and joyful.
Thus, the names Reverence, Power, Sufficiency, Fame, and Joy are different, but they are all one and the same thing in substance.
“Human depravity, then, has broken into fragments that which is by nature one and simple; men try to grasp a part of a thing which has no parts and so get neither the part, which does not exist, nor the whole, which they do not seek” (p.51).
Lady Philosophy re-summarizes: “Honors, fame, and pleasure can be shown to be equally defective; for each is connected with the others, and whoever seeks one without the others cannot get even the one he wants” (p.51).
This prompts Boethius to ask, “What happens when someone tries to get them all at the same time?” (p.52), to which Lady Philosophy responds, “He, indeed, reaches for the height of happiness, but can he find it in these things which, as I have shown, cannot deliver what they promise?” (p.52).
Now that he has grasped the false goods, Lady Philosophy turns to the discussion of the true good.
Boethius says it is clear: “… true and perfect happiness is that which makes a man self-sufficient, powerful, worthy of reverence and renown, and joyful …” (p.52), and that these are all one thing.
Lady Philosophy concurs, if one more thing is added: “Do you imagine that there is any mortal and frail thing which can bring about a condition of this kind?” (p.52).
Thus, we must know where to look for such true happiness.
“But since, as Plato says in his Timaeus, we ought to implore divine help even in small things …”
“We must invoke the Father of all things without whose aid no beginning can be properly made” (p.53).
III.m.9:
One of the most often cited poems herein – the invocation to God for aid to understand.
- --What relationship do we see so far in the work between faith and reason?
Begins with a description of who is God and what He does … “maker,” “govern,” “command,” “place all things in motion,” not impelled, “fashion all things,” “most beautiful,” “order the parts,” “bind the elements,” “release the world-soul,” “create souls and lesser living forms,” “adapting them,” “scatter them,” “call them back,” etc.
Then ends with an imploring request: “Grant, Oh Father, that my mind may rise to Thy sacred throne. Let it see the fountain of good; let it find light, so that the clear light of my soul may fix itself in Thee. Burn off the fogs and clouds of earth and shine through in Thy splendor” (p.54).
III.10:
Supreme good and highest happiness are in God and are God.
Have seen imperfect goods and perfect good; now, we explore where the perfection of happiness resides.
- First ask whether such perfect good can exist at all?
- Where does this perfect good reside?
- The “in” is the “are.”
- On (1): “Now no one can deny that something exists which is a kind of fountain of all goodness; for everything which is found to be imperfect shows its imperfection by the lack of some perfection. It follows that if something is found to be imperfect in its kind, there must necessarily be something of that same kind which is perfect. For without a standard of perfection we cannot judge anything to be imperfect. Nature did not have its origins in the defective and incomplete but in the integral and absolute; it fell from such beginnings to its present meanness and weakness” (p.54).
- “Fountain” –Boethius is implicitly referencing the Neoplatonist idea of emanation theory.
- This idea holds that all that is, is from the One; God creates by an outpouring of himself, which is called procession: the emanation from Him. But, just as water in nature falls to the ground as rain, it also evaporates back up to the sky so as to join/become the clouds from whence it came. Thus, likewise for all creation, it is from Him, but desires to return back to its source; this is called reversion: the return to the One. We saw this in the previous poem’s line: “And when they have turned again toward You, by your gracious law, You call them back like leaping flames” (III.m.9, p.54).
- “… no one can deny that …” –why can no one deny there is this fountain or source of true good?
- We can empirically and rationally demonstrate that there is imperfection; but, how would we know what is imperfect unless we had an idea of perfection? “For without a standard of perfection we cannot judge anything to be imperfect” (p.54). We will see this argument copied in St. Anselm’s Proslogion.
- ‘The origin was perfect; present state is fallen’ –rational consequence of the above.
- We can turn to Biblical support (fall from grace), but Boethius does not add any of this here. He could have turned to Neoplatonic support about the perfection of unity and all duplicity is a partiality, thus, lesser than unity; this is likely implicit, but he does not add it here explicitly. Thus, the support for this must come from the previous argument.
They agree that the perfect good must exist. And then move to point 2:
- On (2): Where does this perfect good reside? Our reason holds that God is good and nothing can be thought better than God, for otherwise he would not be perfect; since we hold that perfection comes before imperfection, we would have to infinitely regress until we found perfection; thus, we will call the absolute perfection by the common name of “God.” Thus, we can prove that “… true happiness has its dwelling place in the most high God” (p.55).
A point to keep in mind here, re: emanation, is that God’s perfection does not diminish in his outpouring of Himself in creation; what he creates is on a spectrum of lesser perfection, but this does not deplete His own perfection.
Boethius is satisfied, but Lady Philosophy adds to the argument by showing how to further prove it:
- “By avoiding the notion that the Father of all things has received from others the highest good with which He is filled, or that He has it naturally in such a way that He and the happiness which He has may be said to differ in essence” (p.55).
--What is this saying?
Let’s walk through the arguments:
- (A) If one said that God received the highest good from others, then we need to identify who was the giver, for that one would be better; but, if we have equated the name “God” with the highest good, then at the end of all our searching, we would find that which we call “God.”
- (B) This one is more subtle. Does God have this greatest good naturally? If He has it by nature, then we are implying that He and the greatest good differ; this would then require an argument to show how the diverse things are joined together (for the good in itself cannot be better than God, and God cannot be different from or possibly lesser than the good). And, since God is the creator of all things, would we not be arguing He created the good He has that would be given Him by nature? The created thing that differs cannot be that from which it differs, hence we would have a logical problem if we argued that God has the good by nature.
- (C) Thus, we conclude: “… whatever is the source of all things must be, in its substance, the highest good” (p.55).
- On (3): This conclusion leads to: The “in” is the “are.” --Lady Philosophy then argues the “residing in” actually means that God “is” the greatest good.
- Since the good cannot be “in” God in the sense of being given to Him by nature, we must conclude that the greatest good “is” God. And, because the greatest good is happiness, then “… God is happiness” (p.56). Why? “… there cannot exist two highest goods which differ from one another” (p.56). “… happiness and God are the highest good; therefore, that must be the highest happiness which is the highest divinity” (p.56).
Becoming Divine: Lady Philosophy then proceeds to offer a “corollary,” a “deduction” that follows from the above proofs. This argument first seems peculiar. “Since men become happy by acquiring happiness, and since happiness is divinity itself, it follows that men become happy by acquiring divinity” (p.56).
--What do we make of this? Does it sound blasphemous in some way?
“For as men become just by acquiring integrity, and wise by acquiring wisdom, so they must in a similar way become gods by acquiring divinity. Thus everyone who is happy is a god and, although it is true that God is one by nature, still there may be many gods by participation” (p.56).
Here, we must remember the theory of emanation. Since everything is [in] God, before it is in creation, everything in creation is of God. Thus, everything that rightly is, is godly in some way, as being God’s creation. Granted, all that is, is a spectrum of good; essentially, all is good in some way because it is created by the Good, but God gives the good to all things in the proportion that is proper to it. Thus, everything that is can then fulfill and be it best allotment of good, or it can turn away from the good, and be lesser than it could be.
Another aspect, however, present here is a debate of mereology: the study of parts and wholes. This is born from Plato and Aristotle and transmitted to Boethius through the Neoplatonists. God is One, but, being the creator, all of creation is parts of Him. Unity is perfection, and the partial is imperfect. Reunion or reversion to the One is a becoming-again perfect; this can be partially established in life by being as perfect as one has been made by the Perfect One. Thus, being as perfect as we are created makes us the many gods; the perfection itself is God Himself.
Lady Philosophy then relates this idea to happiness. Happiness seems to be composed of many different parts, discussed earlier. How do we think through this many-ness? “… would you say that all these are joined together in happiness, as a variety of parts in one body, or does one of the parts constitute the essence of happiness with all the rest complementing it?” (p.56).
Happiness is the good.
Happiness is the fullest sufficiency, the greatest power, honor, fame, and pleasure.
Are these all good members or parts of happiness, or are they “simply related to the good as to their crown?” (p.57). They then rely on the form of the argument used above to show that God “is” happiness and that happiness is not a mere part “in” Him.
If they are all parts, each would differ from the others. If they differ, we cannot logically have differing things be that which they differ from (i.e., is fame is good and pleasure is good, and fame and pleasure are different, they cannot both be the same good, and good cannot be itself).
So, all these must not be parts, but one.
“… the good is the cause and sum of all that is sought for; for if a thing has in it neither the substance nor the appearance of the good, it is not sought or desired by men” (p.57).
And, “It follows, then, that goodness is rightly considered the sum, pivot, and cause of all that men desire” (p.57).
“The most important object of desire is that for the sake of which something else is sought as a means …” (p.57). For example, one wants to ride a horse, but the end is not the riding itself, but the riding as the means to the end of health. Thus, health is the end itself.
Various things are sought as good; the good itself is sought by all; happiness alone is the end, the reason for which the good itself is sought; thus, happiness and good are one.
Finally, then, all of these come together as the conclusion that the essence of God is to be found in the good alone.
III.m.10: another instance of promotion of stoicism.
III.11:
God is One; He is the goal to which all things tend.
Unity: more on partial and whole. Partial goods cannot be good itself if they remain different; they must become one; thus, they become good by becoming an unity.
The Good is the One.
Every good is good insofar as it participates (theory of emanation again) in the perfect good.
Everything is one so long as it lives and subsists in being one. When it ceases to live, it dies and corrupts. E.g. in animal death, soul separates from body.
Does anything, when acting naturally, give up its desire to live and choose to die and decay (p.59)?
B:-- No animals, but I don’t know about plants and inanimate objects.
Lady Philosophy: --even plants and the inanimate, nature is designed for the permanent preservation of the species and the preservation of the individual in its present life.
Phenomena are all proper to the things concerned.
“Indeed, even in living beings, the desire to live comes not from the wishes of the will but from the principles of nature. For often the will is driven by powerful causes to seek death, though nature draws back from it. On the other hand, the work of generation, by which alone the continuation of mortal things is achieved, is sometimes restrained by the will, even trhough nature always desires it. Thus, this love for the self clearly comes from natural instinct and not from voluntary activity” (pp.60-6).
Thus, whatever seeks to exist and endure seeks to unity; all desire unity; “… for without unity existence itself cannot be sustained” (p.61).
Thus, unity is the same as goodness.
And, since the good is that to which all things tend, the end, the goal, is also the good (p.61).
III.m.11:
Searching for the truth – turn the light of inner vision upon himself (p.61).
III.12:
God rules the universe by His goodness; all created things willingly obey.
(Notice the beginning stoic insight, understanding was clouded by body and grief.)
They turn back to the initial questioning (Bk I): The Way the World is Governed.
Boethius first affirmed that the world is governed by rational principle, but then stated that humans did not abide it; asked why God did not ensure justice for good and punishment for bad.
Boethius is certain the world is governed rationally because: achievement, sustenance, and governing.
The power that does this is called by the name “God.”
Lady Philosophy says she is sure that this belief will let them bring him back to “your own country,” that is, the happiness of philosophy.
Sufficiency is an attribute of happiness.
God is absolute happiness.
God is self-sufficient. –He needs no outside help.
(notice here, the non-interventionalist depiction: wheel and rudder.)
Because he is good, and all desire the good, all must desire to willingly follow (p.63).
Nothing opposes Him.
Nothing is impossible for Him.
Can God do evil?
Then evil is nothing.
[Boethius upset -- Platonic style of diversion – make circular arguments] --Why? What make of this
III.m.12:
Moving poem – Orpheus.
“This fable apples to all of you who seek to raise your minds …” (p.66).
Title, Style, Characterization of Lady Philosophy, events that led Boethius to cell, tests his attitude, says she will begin cure gently
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“Nothing in this realm of Providence is left to chance” (Boethius, Consolations, IV.6, p.86). Astrolabe, Book of Birth of Iskandar |
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Book IV) The Problem of Evil
IV.1:
The question of evil quickly turns from “how can there be evil,” to “how surprising it is that evil can go unpunished in a world that is governed by God, who is good.”
Lady Philosophy makes the surprising claim: “… the good are always powerful and the evil always weak and futile, that vice never goes unpunished nor virtue unrewarded, that the good prosper and the evil suffer misfortune …” (pp.67-8). –note “always” and “never:” these are absolute terms.
IV.2:
First, they address power.
Good: have power;
Evil: do not have power;
Good and evil are contraries, thus, necessitate this if good shown to have power, evil must lack it, if evil is shown to lack power, the good must have it.
Success of human action depends on: will and power;
Every intention is to happiness;
Good become good by obtaining the good.
Thus, evil lack the power to obtain that which they desire (the good).
Thus, evil are impotent (p.70).
Good is then tied (radically) to existence:
“For why do they neglect virtue and pursue vice? [1] Is it because they are ignorant of the good? Well, what greater weakness is there than the blindness of ignorance? [2] Or do they know what they should seek, but are driven astray by lust? If so, they are made weak by intemperance and cannot overcome their vices. [3] Or do they knowingly and willfully desert the good and turn to vice? Anyone acting that way loses not only his strength but his very being, since to forsake the common goal of all existence is to forsake existence itself” (p.71).
“Perhaps it may strike some as strange to say that evil men do not exist, especially since they are so numerous; but it is not so strange. For I do not deny that those who are evil are evil; but I do deny that they are, in the pure and simple sense of the term” (p.71).
Yes. This is strange. It relies on a definition of existence as: “For a thing is which maintains its place in nature and acts in accord with its nature. Whatever fails to do this loses the existence which is proper to its nature” (p.71).
Good and Evil: Power and Doing:
IV.3:
Now, they address the “always” and “never,” noted above: that the good are always rewarded and the evil are always punished.
This is another “shocking” claim because empirical evidence seems to suggest to humans otherwise. Thus, Boethius’ surprise about how God’s goodness “allows” this to be the case.
The common goal/end/highest good for all = happiness, which is good.
Good people who do good achieve good, thus, they achieve the reward always.
This good is the greatest good because it cannot be taken away from the good against his/her will (recall Augustine’s definitions).
The seeming goods that the wicked receive, they do not get goods through good, thus, they get these from others, thus they can be taken away from them. The true good that cannot be taken from them they do not obtain. Thus, the evil are punished by not obtaining the good.
Virtue is the reward for the good.
Wickedness itself is the punishment of the evil (p.74).
They readdress the linkage of good and existence, evil and nonexistence here, p.74: “… whatever loses its goodness ceases to be” (74), thus, such are punished by a loss of being.
IV.4:
Despite appearances, the wicked are more unhappy in their wickedness than the good who are suffering injustice: “… the wicked are necessarily more unhappy when they have their way than they would be if they could not do what they wanted to do. If it is bad to desire evil, it is worse to be able to accomplish it; for if it were not accomplished, the disordered will would be ineffectual” (p.75).
Thus, the (seemingly) “unpunished” wicked are more miserable than the punished wicked; which is to say, as well, that the punished wicked are happier than those not punished (p.76).
Just punishment is a good—thus, it makes the wicked happier.
Lady Philosophy then recaps her whole argument thus far (p.77), but Boethius objects, I see the logic, but most people will find this incredible—i.e., it goes against what the everyday seems to offer.
Lady Philosophy then reviews the argument in summary to prove that the unpunished wicked are miserable. Then, offers a long remark on how lawyers forget the truth of logic and try to only persuade … think of Socrates in the Apology, and his critique of how most act in court … and that persuasion that doesn’t align with truth is only a viciousness, which is a disease of the soul (p.79).
IV.5:
Boethius argues how it would be easier to grasp if the world was ruled by chance, as opposed to order (divine order, from a good God)—see Book V for more on chance.
IV.6:
To address Boethius’ concern of Prose Five, Lady Philosophy must talk at length about providence and fate.
IV.1:
The question of evil quickly turns from “how can there be evil,” to “how surprising it is that evil can go unpunished in a world that is governed by God, who is good.”
Lady Philosophy makes the surprising claim: “… the good are always powerful and the evil always weak and futile, that vice never goes unpunished nor virtue unrewarded, that the good prosper and the evil suffer misfortune …” (pp.67-8). –note “always” and “never:” these are absolute terms.
IV.2:
First, they address power.
Good: have power;
Evil: do not have power;
Good and evil are contraries, thus, necessitate this if good shown to have power, evil must lack it, if evil is shown to lack power, the good must have it.
Success of human action depends on: will and power;
- If will lacking, nothing attempted, nothing attained;
- If power is lacking, something attempted, but will frustrated, nothing attained;
- If success comes, will and power both had.
Every intention is to happiness;
- Happiness is good;
- Every intention is to the good;
- All (good and evil) intend to the good.
Good become good by obtaining the good.
- Thus, good people obtain that which they desire (the good).
- Evil do not become evil by attaining the good (for then they would be good);
- Thus, evil people do not obtain that which they desire (the good).
Thus, evil lack the power to obtain that which they desire (the good).
Thus, evil are impotent (p.70).
Good is then tied (radically) to existence:
- The wicked fail to obtain the good.
- This makes them weak, i.e., lacking power to get what they desire.
- The wicked are deprived of strength.
“For why do they neglect virtue and pursue vice? [1] Is it because they are ignorant of the good? Well, what greater weakness is there than the blindness of ignorance? [2] Or do they know what they should seek, but are driven astray by lust? If so, they are made weak by intemperance and cannot overcome their vices. [3] Or do they knowingly and willfully desert the good and turn to vice? Anyone acting that way loses not only his strength but his very being, since to forsake the common goal of all existence is to forsake existence itself” (p.71).
- Notice, here, that Lady Philosophy offers three possibilities as to why the evil neglect virtue and pursue vice. Notice, too, that it is unclear as to whether she selects one as the right answer, or holds all three as reasons.
- [1] is very, very Platonic: all desire the good, when we do evil, it is only our ignorance that has made us mistake something evil for a good. Like in Plato and Augustine, this means that knowledge is a virtue, and knowledge is good; its absence is ignorance, which is a lack of having the good. A lack is a deficiency, a lack of power, thus, this affords ignorance to be equated with weakness.
- [2] is Aristotelian, c.f., Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’ account of akrasia, unrestraint or incontinence, which is when one knows the good, but, due to a weakness of will/character, does the evil knowingly. This is also one of Augustine’s definitions of libido, the inordinate desire, which is a turning from learning/good/eternal to the temporal, and is a cause of sin, or evil. This can be done only from a disordered soul, hence, a weak soul, wherein reason is not in charge.
- [3] is wholly Boethius, and very radical. (We will see Pseudo-Dionysius struggle with this in The Divine Names, but concludes otherwise that even demons are, thus, even as evil incarnate, they have some existence/good—thus, for him, we need to think a proportionate privation.) For Boethius, via Lady Philosophy, the radical third option is that the evil knowingly and willfully turn from virtue to pursue vice. But, this turning by knowledge and will to evil, which has been defined previously as a lack, as no-thing, makes one not only weak, but also not at all … this turning takes one’s existence. The evil, then, here, do not exist at all.
“Perhaps it may strike some as strange to say that evil men do not exist, especially since they are so numerous; but it is not so strange. For I do not deny that those who are evil are evil; but I do deny that they are, in the pure and simple sense of the term” (p.71).
Yes. This is strange. It relies on a definition of existence as: “For a thing is which maintains its place in nature and acts in accord with its nature. Whatever fails to do this loses the existence which is proper to its nature” (p.71).
- This comes very close to an existential view of existence—one’s being is not a given, fixed, determined, pre-determined, inherent given; instead, it is an activity of one being that which one is. One is how one maintains oneself and what one does.
Good and Evil: Power and Doing:
- Nothing is more powerful than God/the Supreme Good.
- God cannot do evil.
- Humans are less powerful than the Supreme Good.
- Humans can do evil.
- Thus, to keep the “doing of evil” from being a power that God lacks, since God cannot lack power, the “power” to do evil cannot be conceived of as a power at all (p.72).
IV.3:
Now, they address the “always” and “never,” noted above: that the good are always rewarded and the evil are always punished.
This is another “shocking” claim because empirical evidence seems to suggest to humans otherwise. Thus, Boethius’ surprise about how God’s goodness “allows” this to be the case.
The common goal/end/highest good for all = happiness, which is good.
Good people who do good achieve good, thus, they achieve the reward always.
This good is the greatest good because it cannot be taken away from the good against his/her will (recall Augustine’s definitions).
The seeming goods that the wicked receive, they do not get goods through good, thus, they get these from others, thus they can be taken away from them. The true good that cannot be taken from them they do not obtain. Thus, the evil are punished by not obtaining the good.
Virtue is the reward for the good.
Wickedness itself is the punishment of the evil (p.74).
They readdress the linkage of good and existence, evil and nonexistence here, p.74: “… whatever loses its goodness ceases to be” (74), thus, such are punished by a loss of being.
IV.4:
Despite appearances, the wicked are more unhappy in their wickedness than the good who are suffering injustice: “… the wicked are necessarily more unhappy when they have their way than they would be if they could not do what they wanted to do. If it is bad to desire evil, it is worse to be able to accomplish it; for if it were not accomplished, the disordered will would be ineffectual” (p.75).
Thus, the (seemingly) “unpunished” wicked are more miserable than the punished wicked; which is to say, as well, that the punished wicked are happier than those not punished (p.76).
Just punishment is a good—thus, it makes the wicked happier.
Lady Philosophy then recaps her whole argument thus far (p.77), but Boethius objects, I see the logic, but most people will find this incredible—i.e., it goes against what the everyday seems to offer.
Lady Philosophy then reviews the argument in summary to prove that the unpunished wicked are miserable. Then, offers a long remark on how lawyers forget the truth of logic and try to only persuade … think of Socrates in the Apology, and his critique of how most act in court … and that persuasion that doesn’t align with truth is only a viciousness, which is a disease of the soul (p.79).
IV.5:
Boethius argues how it would be easier to grasp if the world was ruled by chance, as opposed to order (divine order, from a good God)—see Book V for more on chance.
IV.6:
To address Boethius’ concern of Prose Five, Lady Philosophy must talk at length about providence and fate.
- Providence: government of the world that belongs to the purity of the divine mind; divine reason itself; belongs to God; governs all things; joins all things in their own order (Neoplatonism); embraces all things equally; unfolding of temporal event as present to vision of divine mind; pure simplicity; immovable; simple; rules all.
- Fate: things moved by the government of the world by Providence; belongs to mutable things; disposition by which Providence joins all things according to order; sets particular things in motion according to their given time, place, forms; unfolding of events worked out in time; derives from simplicity of providence; works out things in many ways and in time; moving connection and temporal order of things; everything subject to fate, but fate subject to providence.
Divine Judgment: not for human minds to know, but Lady Philosophy sketches out the diversity of pleasures and sufferings that divine mind can ensue (pp.84-7).
“Nothing in this realm of Providence is left to chance” (p.86).
IV.7:
All fortune is good. Good received as a reward by the good is deemed good fortune. Just punishment is good, thus, what is deemed “bad fortune” is still good.
Ends on a strong gloss of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: “A wise man ought not to regret his struggles with fortune any more than a brave soldier should be intimidated by the noise of battle …” (p.89).
“... it is necessary either that things which are going to happen be foreseen by God, or that what God foresees will in fact happen”
(Boethius, Consolations, V.3, p.95).
Philosophy Holding Planetary Spheres,
illumination from Augustine's de civitate dei,
15c Royal MS 14 D I, folio 337v.
Book V: Chance
In the previous book, Lady Philosophy declares: “Nothing in the realm of Providence is left to chance” (IV, 6, p.86). Providence, we remember, is the divine reason itself that orders all things, whereas fate is the order of things seen in the unfolding events through time. Fate belongs to the mutable things and accounts for difference, whereas Providence belongs to the divine mind. Everything changeable is subject to fate, and fate itself is subject to Providence—hence, everything is ultimately ordered and governed by Providence.
This leads us to Boethius’ concern in Book V: Chance … is there such a thing as chance? While Lady Philosophy has already told us no, this prompts a radical problem: if there is no chance, and Providence rules all, how can there be free will?
V.1:
Boethius: Is there such a thing as chance, and, if so, what is it?
Lady Philosophy clarifies that there are two definitions of “Chance”:
Chance 1: an event produced by random motion, hence, one without causes—this sense of chance does not exist.
V.2:
Boethius: With no chance, can we be free? Can we have free will?
Lady Philosophy affirms that absolutely, we must have free will—“Nevertheless, God, who beholds all things from eternity, foresees all these things in his providence and disposes each to its predestined merits” (V.2, p.94).
V.3:
Two “bad solutions” that Lady Philosophy doesn’t like (these are re-addressed and revised in V.4):
V.4:
The problem with the problem of freedom and divine foresight is because: human reason cannot comprehend divine simplicity.
Lady Philosophy re-addresses the bad solutions:
Does all happen by necessity? First the case is made for “yes,” then it is shown to be “no, some things happen without necessity.” This leads to the conclusion: Foreknowledge does not impose necessity on (all) outcomes.
They move to a discussion of Knowledge: knowing is by the capacity of the knower, not by the thing known. And explore this further through a consideration of how things are known: by senses, imagination, (human) reason, and (divine) intelligence.
V.5:
Here, intelligence is shown to be God’s and to be most excellent.
Human reason is to the divine mind like senses are to reason … i.e., the great disparity in power to truth between our sensory knowledge and our reason (e.g., think of how senses can deceive us: if you are banged in the head, you see double, but this is a failing of sensory perception, and reason can discern that it is not true) is like the gulf that separates our knowledge from God’s.
But, no matter our weak reason, we must try to raise ourselves to this mind and try to grasp: divine foreknowledge CAN see uncertain events (recall V.3, where she showed that we cannot know the uncertain).
V.6:
The SOLUTION to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom:
ETERNITY: the whole, perfect, simultaneous possession of endless life.
God is eternal; the world is (merely) perpetual.
God is in the eternal present; hence, foreknowledge = knowledge of a never-changing present.
Knowledge does not change the nature or properties of things.
Differentiate two types of Necessity:
(Some) Events in themselves happen from free will.
In the previous book, Lady Philosophy declares: “Nothing in the realm of Providence is left to chance” (IV, 6, p.86). Providence, we remember, is the divine reason itself that orders all things, whereas fate is the order of things seen in the unfolding events through time. Fate belongs to the mutable things and accounts for difference, whereas Providence belongs to the divine mind. Everything changeable is subject to fate, and fate itself is subject to Providence—hence, everything is ultimately ordered and governed by Providence.
This leads us to Boethius’ concern in Book V: Chance … is there such a thing as chance? While Lady Philosophy has already told us no, this prompts a radical problem: if there is no chance, and Providence rules all, how can there be free will?
V.1:
Boethius: Is there such a thing as chance, and, if so, what is it?
Lady Philosophy clarifies that there are two definitions of “Chance”:
Chance 1: an event produced by random motion, hence, one without causes—this sense of chance does not exist.
- Why? –How can there be something random if God ordered everything? –Nothing can come from nothing.
- Lady Philosophy first credits Aristotle’s chance: “Whenever anything is done for one reason, but something other than what was intended happens on account of other reasons, it is called chance” (V.1. p.92)—but she clarifies that the unintentional is a matter of perception, not actuality itself, that is, the unexpected happens due to a series of causes, just causes that we were not paying attention to (e.g., a farmer digs the earth to plant, but finds gold—this seems like chance, but there are causes for the gold being there, they are just not the same series of causes in the chain of events of the farmer digging so as to plant)—this is a “coincidence of causes” (92), and these causes come together because of the perfect order of Providence.
V.2:
Boethius: With no chance, can we be free? Can we have free will?
Lady Philosophy affirms that absolutely, we must have free will—“Nevertheless, God, who beholds all things from eternity, foresees all these things in his providence and disposes each to its predestined merits” (V.2, p.94).
V.3:
Two “bad solutions” that Lady Philosophy doesn’t like (these are re-addressed and revised in V.4):
- 1) Things do not happen because Providence foresees them, but Providence foresees them because things will happen. Necessity not in foresight, but what will happen is foreseen. This “solution” presupposes that there is necessity is in things. Problem: we don’t care here about what is the cause; we care about whether the fulfillment of the foreseen is necessary.
- e.g.: if you are sitting, I believe you are sitting; if my belief is true, then you are necessarily sitting; there is necessity in both cases: you sit, my opinion is true; but, you do not sit because my opinion is true; hence: cause from one side (you, you sit), but there is necessity in both.
- 2) Events are foreseen because they will happen, but they do not happen because they are foreseen. (So far, this is Augustine’s solution.) However, the conclusion she takes this to is that: freedom of the will is destroyed. Why? Because “it is necessary either that things which are going to happen by foreseen by God, or that what God foresees will in fact happen” (V.3, p.95).
- The outcome cannot be uncertain if it is known (cf. V.5).
- God knows, hence cannot be uncertain.
- Hence, no free will.
- Hence: no just punishment and reward; virtue and vice are meaningless; God is responsible for evil; and prayer is useless (note these severe consequences).
V.4:
The problem with the problem of freedom and divine foresight is because: human reason cannot comprehend divine simplicity.
Lady Philosophy re-addresses the bad solutions:
Does all happen by necessity? First the case is made for “yes,” then it is shown to be “no, some things happen without necessity.” This leads to the conclusion: Foreknowledge does not impose necessity on (all) outcomes.
They move to a discussion of Knowledge: knowing is by the capacity of the knower, not by the thing known. And explore this further through a consideration of how things are known: by senses, imagination, (human) reason, and (divine) intelligence.
V.5:
Here, intelligence is shown to be God’s and to be most excellent.
Human reason is to the divine mind like senses are to reason … i.e., the great disparity in power to truth between our sensory knowledge and our reason (e.g., think of how senses can deceive us: if you are banged in the head, you see double, but this is a failing of sensory perception, and reason can discern that it is not true) is like the gulf that separates our knowledge from God’s.
But, no matter our weak reason, we must try to raise ourselves to this mind and try to grasp: divine foreknowledge CAN see uncertain events (recall V.3, where she showed that we cannot know the uncertain).
V.6:
The SOLUTION to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom:
ETERNITY: the whole, perfect, simultaneous possession of endless life.
God is eternal; the world is (merely) perpetual.
God is in the eternal present; hence, foreknowledge = knowledge of a never-changing present.
Knowledge does not change the nature or properties of things.
Differentiate two types of Necessity:
- Simple Necessity: e.g. all men are mortal;
- Conditional Necessity: e.g. if one is walking, one must be walking.
(Some) Events in themselves happen from free will.
Of Boethius, Benedict XVI wrote: "It is precisely because of his tragic end that he can also speak from the heart of his own experience to contemporary man, and especially to the multitudes who suffer the same fate because of the injustice inherent in so much of "human justice""
--Benedict XVI, lecture to a general audience, Paul VI Audience Hall, Wednesday, 12 March 2008.